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Michael Smith is employed as a bookkeeper with Acme Company. He has
no contract limiting Acme's right to terminate him. Some of Acme's custom-
ers are suing Acme for fraud, and Michael is subpoenaed to testify in the suit.
A manager at Acme tells Michael that if he gives testimony harmful to the
company, he will be discharged. Michael testifies truthfully, and the next day
he is fired. He sues Acme for wrongful discharge of employment.
Despite the traditional rule that an employee hired for an indefinite period
can be fired for any reason, most courts would allow Michael to bring such a
wrongful termination claim against Acme, because Acme's behavior contra-
venes an important public policy-encouraging truthful testimony.
Now suppose the same facts, except Michael works not as an employee,
but as an independent contractor hired for an indefinite period. In most courts,
Michael will not be able to bring such a wrongful termination claim, although
the same public policy is at issue. Why is there a distinction between Michael
the employee and Michael the independent contractor? When should consid-
erations of public policy restrict a company's ability to terminate the services
of an independent contractor?
This question is not merely an academic one. The incidence of such claims
has increased in recent years. The courts in most such cases have refused to
allow independent contractors to base a wrongful termination claim on a viola-
tion of public policy; the claims are often dismissed with little or no analysis.
These cases deserve a closer look than they have received to date.
In determining whether and when such a cause of action should be avail-
able to independent contractors, it is necessary to re-examine the reasons the
public policy exception to the employment-at-will rule was adopted and how it
has evolved. Courts recognizing a cause of action for wrongful discharge for
violation of public policy tend to do so when an employer discharges an em-
1 Visiting Scholar, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. J.D. University
of Michigan Law School, 1991; B.A., Douglass College, Rutgers University, 1987.
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ployee in retaliation for refusing to violate the law, reporting unlawful conduct,
or performing some civic duty.' Courts also tend to allow such a claim when
an employee is discharged in retaliation for exercising some right, such as fil-
ing a worker's compensation claim.2 A plaintiff pursuing this type of claim
must point to some expression of public policy that the employer has violated
by the termination. In Michael Smith's case, for example, one can find an ex-
pression of the public policy encouraging truthful testimony in the statute
making perjury a crime.
This Article proposes a "source-derivative" approach to these types of
cases: When an independent contractor presses a claim for wrongful termina-
tion based on a public policy violation, instead of basing its decision solely on
employment status, the court needs to take a close look at the source of public
policy offered by the plaintiff. Assuming it is a statute, the most commonly
cited source of public policy, the court must first ask what the purpose of the
statute is. Was it enacted to protect the plaintiff as an employee? Or is the stat-
ute's purpose to protect some public good that is not dependent on the plain-
tiff's employment status?
When the underlying source of public policy was enacted to promote a
public policy that is not dependent on an employment relationship between the
parties, there is no reason to limit the public policy case to employees. For ex-
ample, the public policy at stake in Michael Smith's case-the prevention of
perjury-has nothing to do with regulating the employer-employee relation-
ship. The purpose of the statute outlawing perjury transcends the parties' rela-
tionship. Michael Smith should therefore be able to bring a wrongful termina-
tion claim, regardless of his employment status.
On the other hand, independent contractors should not be able to base
wrongful termination claims on a source of public policy that was written to
protect employees only. For example, suppose that an independent contractor
is terminated for refusing to take a polygraph examination. If the sole expres-
sion of public policy to which the contractor can point is a statute prohibiting
employers from giving polygraph tests to employees, then the contractor should
not be permitted to use that statute as the basis of a wrongful discharge claim.
Parts I and II of this Article outline, respectively, the American employ-
ment-at-will rule and the development of the public policy exception to that
rule. Part III discusses the current state of case law considering the application
of the public policy exception to independent contractors. These cases are then
reconsidered in Part IV using the proposed source-derivative approach to this
type of wrongful discharge claim, with explanations of how such an approach
is consistent with the traditional judicial function of invalidating contractual
1. See infra notes 57, 58, 60, and accompanying text.
2. See infra note 59, and accompanying text.
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terms that violate public policy.
I. THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL RULE
The American employment-at-will rule says that absent a contract other-
wise, an employer may fire an employee for any reason or no reason at all
without incurring legal liability.
3
This was a departure from the rule in English common law, where indefi-
nite service relationships were presumed to be for a year.4 Early American
cases considering the issue of employment duration often looked to the English
rule.5 But the English rule had been based on the classification of master and
servant law as a domestic relation,6 and as the industrial revolution progressed
and the employment relationship became more commercial, the cases increas-
ingly did not fit into the traditional master-servant framework.7 The result was
a confused state of the law on the issue of indefinite hirings.8
In his 1877 treatise on master and servant law, Horace Wood purported to
resolve the issue in American law. He pronounced:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hir-
ing at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon
him to establish it by proof. A hiring at so much a day, week, month or year, no
time being specified, is an indefinite hiring , and no presumption attaches that it
was for a day even, but only at the rate fixed for whatever time the party may serv-
ice. It is competent for either party to show what the mutual understanding of the
parties was in reference to the matter; but unless their understanding was mutual
that the service was to extend for a certain fixed and definite period, it is an indefi-
nite hiring and is determinable at the will of either ;arty, and in this respect there is
no distinction between domestic and other servants.
Some since have questioned Wood's scholarship on this issue, asserting
3. Payne v. Western & At. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled on other grounds by
Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915). Of course, employer and employee may contract for a
definite term, but this is atypical outside the collective bargaining arena. One reason individual em-
ployees might not negotiate a just-cause termination provision is that an employee attempting to obtain
such a just-cause term in his or her contract might be perceived as a slacker, and not hired. Shubha
Ghosh, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Termination Rights: A Fresh Look at the Employment at
Will Debate with Applications to Franchising and Family Law, 75 OR. L. REV. 969, 981 (1996).
4. Blackstone wrote:
If the hiring be general, without any particular time limited, the law construes it to be a hiring
for a year; upon a principle of natural equity, that the servant shall serve, and the master
maintain him, throughout all the revolutions of the respective seasons; as well when there is
work to be done, as when there is not.
I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *413.
5. Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118,
122 (1976); Sanford M. Jacoby, The Duration of Indefinite Employment Contracts in the United States
and England: An Historical Analysis, 5 COMP. LAB. L.J. 85, 91 (1982).
6. Feinman, supra note 5, at 123.
7. 1d; see also, Jacoby, supra note 5, at 91.
8. Jacoby, supra note 5, at 109-10.
9. HORACE G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (1877).
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that the rule was unsupported by the authorities on which he relied.' 0 Never-
theless, the rule was thereafter generally adopted at common law across the
country, and became known as the employment-at-will rule or doctrine.
11
Strict application of the rule-i.e., applying the rule without exception-pro-
duced some harsh results for employees. Courts dismissed, for example,
claims by employees fired for serving jury duty, 12 reporting an employer's il-
legal stock manipulations to authorities, 13 and refusing to vote for an em-
ployer's choice of candidates in a city election.
14
The rule has been characterized as one reflecting the 19th century's phi-
losophy of free enterprise, which included an employer's unrestrained right to
discharge employees. 15 A common justification for the at-will doctrine was
the contract rule that mutuality of obligation must exist for an employment
contract to be binding: If employees could end the relationship at will by quit-
ting, the employer should be able to do the same.'6 Critics of the mutuality ra-
tionale have countered that obligations between employers and employees need
not be mutual,' 7 and that in a modem economy, the employee's freedom to
terminate the relationship is often illusory.' 8 Today, the few modem courts
that adhere to the traditional at-will rule without common law exceptions tend
to do so because of a belief that creating such a cause of action is best left to
the legislature. 19
10. E.g., Feinman, supra note 5, at 126-27; Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment-
at-Will Rule Revisited, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 733, 734 (1991); Clyde W. Summers, The Contract of Em-
ployment and the Rights of Individual Employees: Fair Representation and Employment at Will, 52
FORDHAM L. REV. 1082, 1083-85 (1984); J. Peter Shapiro & James F. Tune, Note, Implied Contract
Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REv. 335, 341 (1974). Other commentators have come to Wood's
defense. See, e.g., Deborah A. Ballam, Exploding the Original Myth Regarding Empoyment-At- Will:
The True Origins of the Doctrine, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91 (1996) (arguing that although
Wood did not adequately support his assertion, he was correct in stating that employment at will was the
rule in the United States at that time); Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, The Doubtful Provenance of
"Wood's Rule" Revisited, 22 ARIz. ST. L.J. 551, 554 (1990) (arguing that Wood's authorities did sup-
port the principle for which Wood cited them).
11. Feinman, supra note 5, at 126; Jacoby, supra note 5, at 113; Shapiro & Tune, supra note 10, at
342.
12. Mallard v. Boring, 182 Cal. App. 2d 390 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960).
13. Marin v. Jacuzzi, 224 Cal. App. 2d 549 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964).
14. Bell v. Faulkner, 75 S.W.2d 612 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934).
15. Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Ex-
ercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404, 1416 (1967); Alfred W. Blumrosen, Workers'
Rights Against Employers and Unions: Justice Francis-A Judge for Our Season, 24 RUTGERS L. REv.
480, 481 (1970); Shapiro & Tune, supra note 10, at 343-44.
16. Blades, supra note 15, at 1419; Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dis-
missal Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481, 484 (1976); Summers, supra note 10, at 1097-98.
17. Blades, supra note 15, at 1419; Summers, supra note 10, at 1098.
18. Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1045 (Utah 1989).
19. E.g., Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So.2d 1130, 1131 (Ala. 1977); Murphy v. American
Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 89-90 (N.Y. 1983).
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II. EVOLUTION OF THE COMMON LAW PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION TO THE
EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL RULE
The employment-at-will doctrine has come under much criticism over the
past several decades as being anachronistic and out of step with the post-
industrial age, and in the 1960s and 1970s, the lack of remedies for wrongfully
discharged employees prompted commentators to call for a limit on the em-
ployer's freedom to discharge.
20
Employment at will is still the presumption in nearly every state. 21 (It is a
statutory rule in a few states.22 In most states, however, it remains a judicial
doctrine.) But now there are various exceptions to the rule. That is, courts in
most jurisdictions still recognize the traditional rule, but to varying degrees
courts have recognized, and legislatures have enacted, exceptions to it. Today,
discharged employees must plead such an exception to state a cause of action.
Statutory exceptions to the employment-at-will rule include legislation
prohibiting termination for union activities, or for discrimination based on race,
sex, disability, age, and other characteristics. Many jurisdictions have also en-
acted statutes protecting employees from retaliation for taking certain actions,
for example reporting unlawful conduct to authorities.23 Public employees of-
20. E.g., 3A LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM & ARTHUR J. JACOBSON, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 674
(Supp. 1998); Blades, supra note 15; Cornelius J. Peck. Unjust Discharges from Employment: A Neces-
sary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1979); Summers, Individual Protection, supra note 16;
Daniel A. Mathews, Note, A Common Law Action for the Abusively Discharged Employee, 26
HASTINGS L.J. 1435 (1975).
21. Montana is the exception. Montana's Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act of 1987 pro-
vides a statutory cause of action to employees discharged without good cause, once the employee has
completed a probationary period. The statute defines "good cause" as "reasonably job-related grounds
for dismissal based on failure to satisfactorily perform job duties, disruption of employer's operation or
other, legitimate business reason." MONT. CODE ANN § 39-2-903(5) (1999). The statute also provides
for a statutory public policy exception, discussed infra note 29.
22. E.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West Supp. 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-7-1 (Supp. 2000); LA.
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2747 (West 1973); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-03-01 (Supp. 1999); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 60-4-4 (Michie Supp. 2000). Despite such codification, the courts in some of these states have
carved out exceptions to the at-will rule. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330
(Cal. 1980) (recognizing exception to at-will rule based on violation of public policy); Johnson v.
Kreiser's Inc., 433 N.W.2d 225 (S.D. 1988).
23. State and federal statutes prohibiting retaliation against "whistleblowing" vary widely in their
scope, application, and remedies. For example, some cover all employees; others cover only public em-
ployees. Some statutes protect the employee only if he or she reports to a governmental agency; others
protect those who make an internal report. Some are appendages to substantive regulatory programs,
such as the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 660 (Supp. 1998). Such anti-retaliation
provisions do not always provide a private right of action, but merely permit the aggrieved employee the
right to file a complaint with the appropriate administrative agency, which then has the discretion to take
action. See WILLIAM J. HOLLOWAY & MICHAEL J. LEECH, EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION: RIGHTS AND
REMEDIES 280-86 (2d ed. 1993); 2 HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE
§§ 11.7-11.8 (4th ed. 1998); MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, ET. AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 9.18 (1994) [herein-
after ROTHSTEIN, ET. AL.]; MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 923 (4th ed. 1998) [hereinafter ROTHSTEIN AND LIEBMAN]; INDIvIDUAL EMPLOYMENT
RIGHTS MANUAL (BNA) 527:118-22 (1998) (and cases cited therein).
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ten have additional remedies under statutory or constitutional provisions.
Depending on the jurisdiction, common law exceptions to the at-will rule
might, for example, be based on breach of an express or implied promise of
continuing employment, 24 a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing,25 or an employer's violation of public policy. The idea behind
this public policy exception is that despite the traditional at-will rule, "a dis-
charge is wrongful and actionable if it is motivated by the fact that the em-
ployee did something that public policy encourages or that he refused to do
something that public policy forbids or condemns."
26
This article focuses only on this common law public policy exception to the
at-will rule.
Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 39627 is
widely regarded as the first case in which a court recognized a wrongful dis-
charge action based on an employer's violation of public policy. Peter Peter-
mann was employed as a business agent for the defendant union. The union's
secretary-treasurer had hired Petermann and told him that his employment
would continue as long as his work was satisfactory. Petermann was thereafter
subpoenaed to testify before a committee of the California legislature. He al-
leged that the union's secretary-treasurer instructed him to make certain false
statements to the committee. Petermann testified truthfully and was fired the
next day.
The California Court of Appeals held that the traditional employment-at-
will rule was limited by considerations of public policy:
It would be obnoxious to the interests of the state and contrary to public policy and
sound morality to allow an employer to discharge any employee, whether the em-
ployment be for a designated or unspecified duration, on the ground that the em-
ployee declined to commit perjury, an act specifically enjoined by statute.... To
hold that one's continued employment could be made contingent upon his commis-
sion of a felonious act at the instance of his employer would be to encourage crimi-
nal conduct upon the part of both the employee and employer and serve to contami-
24. In these cases, courts hold employers to their assurances that they will terminate only for just
cause and/or utilize certain disciplinary procedures before termination. Courts will review employer
representations such as employee handbooks and oral statements. Courts vary widely on what state-
ments will bind an employer, and when a disclaimer will negate those promises. See ROTHSTEIN, ET.
AL., supra note 23, §§ 9.2-9.5; George L. Blum, Annotation, Effectiveness of Employer's Disclaimer of
Representations in Personnel Manual or Employee Handbook Altering At- Will Employment Relation-
ship, 17 A.L.R.5th 1 (1994); Theresa Ludwig Kruk, Annotation, Right to Discharge Allegedly "At-Will"
Employee as Affected by Employer's Promulgation of Employment Policies as to Discharge, 33
A.L.R.4th 120 (1984).
25. Few states have applied the covenant to indefinite employment relationships. E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 7.17a (1982); ROTHSTEIN, ET. AL., supra note 23, §
9.6. Courts that do accept such a cause of action tend to do so when the employer has denied the em-
ployee commissions or benefits already earned during the employment. ROTHSTEIN, ET. AL., supra note
23, § 9.6.
26. Percival v. General Motors Corp., 539 F.2d 1126, 1130 (8th Cir. 1976).
27. 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App, 1959).
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nate the honest administration of public affairs. This is patently contrary to the
public welfare. The law must encourage and not discourage truthful testimony. The
public policy of this state requires that every impediment, however remote to the
above objective, must be struck down when encountered.28
Since Petermann, most states have recognized a common law exception to
the employment-at-will rule based on a violation of public policy.29 In most of
those jurisdictions, a wrongful discharge claim based on violation of public
28. Id. at 27.
29. See PERRITT, supra note 23, §§ 7.1. State courts did not accept the public policy exception
overnight; while the Petermann case was decided in 1959, most states did not recognize the public pol-
icy exception until the 1970s and 1980s.
In a few states a public policy exception has been codified. For example, New Jersey's Conscien-
tious Employee Protection Act includes a prohibition against retaliation when an employee objects to or
refuses to participate in any activity, policy, or practice that she reasonably believes is incompatible with
a clear mandate of public policy regarding public health, safety, or welfare. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-3
(West 1995). Montana's Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act of 1987 provides a cause of action
for employees discharged in retaliation for refusing to violate public policy or reporting a public policy
violation. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(1) (1999). The statute defines "public policy" as "a policy in
effect at the time of the discharge concerning the public health, safety, or welfare established by consti-
tutional provision, statute, or administrative rule." Id. § 39-2-903(7).
A few states have not adopted a common law public policy exception to the employment-at-will
rule. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Dabbs, 703 So. 2d 979 (Ala. 1997) (reiterating Alabama's refusal to rec-
ognize the public-policy exception, but allowing claims of outrage and privacy when plaintiff was har-
assed and discharged for getting married); Ochab v. Morrison Inc., 517 So. 2d 763 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1987) (denying public policy claim to bartender discharged for refusing to serve intoxicated patron);
Jellico v. Effingham County, 471 S.E.2d 36 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (failing to recognize claim for building
inspector fired for refusing to certify buildings in violation of building codes); Gil v. Metal Service
Corp., 412 So. 2d 706 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (refusing to recognize public policy claim for employee dis-
charged for refusal to violate consumer protection law); Pacheco v. Raytheon Co., 623 A.2d 464 (R.I.
1993) (stating "unequivocally" there is no cause of action for wrongful discharge in Rhode Island).
New York's highest court, in Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86 (1983), de-
clined to recognize a common law cause of action based on public policy for an employee terminated for
reporting co-employees' illegal accounting practices to upper management and because of age discrimi-
nation. In Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 1992), however, the court did allow a breach-of-
implied-contract claim brought by a law firm associate fired for insisting on the firm's compliance with
code of professional responsibility by reporting fellow associate's misconduct.
The Court of Appeals of Minnesota recognized a common law public policy exception in Phipps v.
Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 396 N.W.2d 588, 592 (1986). The Minnesota Supreme Court granted the
petition for review, but before it issued its opinion the legislature enacted a whistleblower statute, MINN.
STAT. § 181.932 (1999). The status of the common law claim is unclear. Federal courts have said that
the common law public policy claim does not exist since the whistleblower statute was enacted. See
Thompson v. Campbell, 845 F. Supp. 665, 676 (D. Minn. 1994), and cases cited therein.
The Arizona Supreme Court recognized a common law public policy exception in Wagenseller v.
Scottsdale Memorial Hospital, 710 P.2d 1025 (1985). In 1996, however, the state legislature enacted
the Arizona Employment Protection Act. ARIz. REv. STAT. §§ 23-1501 to 1502 (2000). The AEPA
codifies the employment-at-will doctrine, but makes exceptions. For example, an employee may bring a
wrongful discharge claim under the Act if discharged in retaliation for certain protected acts. The stat-
ute to a limited extent thus codifies the public policy exception, laying out nine protected acts: refusal to
violate the state constitution or a state statute; reasonable disclosure by the employee of the employer's
violation of the state constitution or a state statute; exercise of workers' compensation rights; jury serv-
ice; exercise of voting rights; exercise of choice regarding union membership; service in the National
Guard or armed forces; exercise of right to be free from extortion of fees or gratuities as a condition of
employment; and exercise of the right to be free from coercion to purchase goods or supplies from any
particular person as a condition of employment. The Act explicitly abolished the common law public
policy claim. ARiz. REv. STAT. § 23-1501.3(c).
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policy sounds in tort,30 reflecting the recognition that the duties breached by
employers in these cases are not part of any contract between the parties but
are duties imposed by law outside the contract.
31
While common law exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine are
principally a matter of state law, courts have also allowed wrongful discharge
claims in maritime cases based on public policy violation as an exception to the
general rule that a seaman's employment is terminable at will.
32
Even among those states that recognize a common law public policy ex-
ception to the employment-at-will doctrine, there is no universally accepted
definition of a public policy violation. About the only thing all courts agree on
is that public policy "as a concept is notoriously resistant to precise defini-
tion."33
Lord Truro's definition is still a good starting point:
Public policy is that principle of the law which holds that no subject can lawfully do
that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public, or against the public good,
which may be termed, as it sometimes has been the policy of the law, or public
policy in relation to the administration of the law. 4
Public policy may also be said
to be the community common sense and common conscience, extended and applied
throughout the state to matters of public morals, public health, public safety, public
welfare, and the like. It is that general and well-settled public opinion relating to
man's plain, palpable duty to his fellow men, having due regard to all the circum-
stances of each particular relation and situation.
3 5
The meaning of "public policy" will necessarily depend on the nature and
30. FARNSWORTH, supra note 25, § 7.17a.
31. 82 AM. JUR. 2d Wrongful Discharge § 17 (1992); see Koehrer v. Superior Court, 226 Cal.
Rptr. 820, 826 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) ("[T]he theoretical reason for labeling the discharge wrongful ... is
not based on the terms and conditions of the contract, but rather arises out of a duty implied in law on
the part of the employer to conduct its affairs in compliance with public policy .. "); Wilson v. City of
Monroe, 943 P.2d 1134, 1136 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) ("[Plaintiff's] right to be free from wrongful ter-
mination in contravention of public policy may not be altered or waived by private agreement, and is
therefore a nonnegotiable right.").
32. See, e.g., Smith v. Atlas Off-Shore Boat Service, Inc., 653 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1981) (allowing
seaman's wrongful discharge claim for retaliation against plaintiff's personal injury suit brought under
Jones Act); Reyes v. Energy Transportation Corp., 96 Civ. 3321, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6864
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (allowing same claim in refusal-to-rehire case); Borden v. Amoco Coastwise Trading
Co., 985 F. Supp. 692 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (applying maritime and Texas law and allowing claim by tug
boat captain fired for refusing to sail vessel into a storm carrying crew and extremely toxic chemicals);
Seymore v. Lake Tahoe Cruises, Inc., 888 F. Supp. 1029, 1034-35 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (allowing claim
when plaintiff-ship captain was fired for refusing to take out passenger vessel with leaking hull); Baiton
v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 661 So. 2d 313 (Fla. Ct. App. 1995) (allowing claim for retaliation for
being willing to testify on behalf of co-employee in Jones Act suit against employer, and for refusing to
give false statement in same). But see, e.g, Meaige v. Hartley Marine Corp., 925 F.2d 700 (4th Cir.
1991) (refusing to permit claim by seaman fired in retaliation for refusing to carry out assignment that
would have violated federal statute limiting number of hours boat was allowed to operate).
33. Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 687 (Cal. 1992).
34. Egerton v. Earl Brownlow, 4 D. 1, 196 (1853).
35. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., v. Kinney, 115 N.E. 505, 507 (Ohio 1916).
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context of the case at hand, and the courts have struggled with the definition in
the context of wrongful discharge claims. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin
has struck a commonly expressed note of hesitance: "Courts should proceed
cautiously when making public policy determinations. No employer should be
subject to suit merely because a discharged employee's conduct was praise-
worthy or because the public may have derived some benefit from it."36 In a
frequently quoted passage, the Illinois Supreme Court has said that "a matter
must strike at the heart of a citizen's social rights, duties, and responsibilities
before the tort will be allowed., 37 The Oregon Supreme Court has framed the
issue by asking whether there is an important community interest at stake, such
that a termination interfering with such interest warrants compensation.
38
In determining when a case warrants application of the public policy ex-
ception, some courts have drawn an analogy to illegal contracts. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court, for example, has said that "at root, the public policy ex-
ception rests on the recognition that in a civilized society the rights of each
person are necessarily limited by the rights of others and of the public large;
this is the delicate balance which holds such societies together. . . .,9 It con-
cluded that it is "a very short and logical step, therefore, from declining to en-
force contracts inimical to law or the public interest, to refusing to sanction
terminations in contravention of fundamental public policy. ' 4° That same
court, in a subsequent case, noted that "the doctrinal foundation of the public
policy tort is not so much the plaintif's continued interest in employment as
the preservation of the public interest .... ,,4 An employee who states a
wrongful discharge claim for violation of public policy "is provided a remedy
in tort not only to compensate the individual plaintiff for the loss of employ-
ment but as an indirect means of vindicating fundamental public policy it-
self.
'42
Courts often approach public policy cases by balancing the interests of the
employee, the employer, and the public. A court will typically identify the em-
ployee's interest as one of job continuity and the employer's interest as one of
running a business with minimal interference.43 The interests of the public will
36. Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 840 (1983).
37. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878-79 (1981).
38. Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 516 (Or. 1975) (affirming award of compensatory damages for
wrongful discharge due to employee's serving jury duty).
39. Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 686-87 (Cal. 1992).
40. Id. at 687.
41. General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 497 (Cal. 1994).
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (I1. 1981); Adler v.
American Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464,470 (Md. 1981); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549,
551 (N.H. 1974); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 71 (1980). The balancing act was
criticized in Note, Protecting Employees At-Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Ex-
ception, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1931, 1949-50 (1983): "Courts often present their determinations of the
public interest as the result of a 'balancing' of the social interests at stake. The rhetoric of balancing
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vary according the particular facts of a case. In addition, courts often identify
the interests of the public in workforce stability and discouragement of litiga-
tion.44
Courts differ in how they articulate the prima facie wrongful discharge
claim based on a public policy violation. But while the vocabulary may differ
from court to court, the core elements of the claim tend to be these: (1) The
plaintiff must identify some expression of public policy that is implicated by
the discharge. (In Michael Smith's case, that expression would be the criminal
prohibition against perjury.) (2) The plaintiffs act or refusal to act promotes
the public policy. (Michael testified truthfully at a court proceeding.) (3) The
defendant fired the plaintiff because of the plaintiffs act or refusal to act. (Mi-
chael was fired allegedly because of his testimony.) 45 Whether the plaintiff has
identified a public policy to support a claim is usually a question of law, but
whether the discharge in fact violates that policy is usually a question for the
jury.46 The employee bears the burden of proving that the termination violates
notions of public policy.
47
The public policy exception will be applied only when the plaintiff can
identify a specific expression of public policy.48 Michael Smith could satisfy
this requirement by pointing to the statute making perjury a crime. Courts pre-
fer statutory expressions of public policy to form the basis of this type of
wrongful discharge action,49 and are likely to accept state constitutional provi-
sions as sources of public policy, at least to the extent those provisions reach
private action.50 Numerous courts accept case law as a source of public policy
in wrongful discharge cases, but courts are reluctant to glean public policy in
the absence of constitutional or statutory authority.51 Still other courts have
52 53accepted federal law or the law of other states as a source of public policy,
tends to conceal the court's ability to control the outcome of any such balance by its choice of the inter-
ests to be weighed." (Citations omitted).
44. E.g., Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 71 (1980); Thompson v. St. Regis Pa-
per Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1089 (Wash. 1984); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 841
(Wis. 1983).
45. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 25, § 7.17a, at 368 ("All courts insist on a causal connection
between the protected activity and the discharge."). Some courts have permitted public policy cases to
be brought for retaliatory action short of discharge. See infra note 65.
46. ROTHSTEIN, ET. AL., supra note 23, § 9.10. In New Hampshire, however, both questions ordi-
narily go to the jury. Short v. School Administrative Unit, 612 A.2d 364, 370 (N.H. 1992); Cloutier v.
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc., 436 A.2d 1140, 1145, 1147 (N.H. 1981).
47. See PERRITT, supra note 23, § 7.2.
48. Id § 7.10.
49. ROTHSTEIN, ET. AL., supra note 23, § 9.10.
50. PERRITT, supra note 23, § 7.11; ROTHSTEIN, ET. AL., supra note 23, § 9.10.
51. PERRITr, supra note 23, § 7.16; ROTHSTEIN, ET. AL., supra note 23, § 9.10.
52. PERRITr, supra note 23, § 7.13.
53. E.g., Reinneck v. Taco Bell Corp., 696 N.E.2d 839 (II1. App. 1998) (allowing claim when
plaintiff fired in retaliation for filing claim against defendant under another state's workers' compensa-
tion law); Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992) (holding that laws of other states may pro-
vide basis of public policy claim under appropriate circumstances).
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with some courts going so far as to allow public policy claims based on ad-
ministrative rules, regulations, or decisions. 54 Courts have differed over
whether to recognize as sources of public policy local codes or ordinances,
55
and professional ethics rules.56
The cases allowing a wrongful discharge claim for violation of public pol-
icy tend to be those in which the plaintiff was discharged in retaliation for re-
fusing to perform an unlawful act;57 reporting illegal activity (whistleblow-
ing); 58 exercising some right (usually statutory);
59 or performing a civic duty. 60
54. E.g., Green v. Ralee Engineering Co., 960 P.2d 1046 (Cal. 1998); Norris v. Hawaiian Airlines,
Inc., 842 P.2d 634 (Haw. 1992); Walt's Drive-A-Way Service, Inc. v. Powell, 638 N.E.2d 857 (Ind.
App. 1994); Winkelman v. Beloit Memorial Hospital, 483 N.W.2d 12 (Wis. 1992).
55. Compare, e.g., Morishige v. Spencecliff Corp., 720 F. Supp. 829 (D. Haw. 1989) (allowing
claim based on city building and liquor codes), with Kramer v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 723
A.2d 529 (Md. Ct. App. 1999) (disallowing claim based on city charter), Greenwood v. Taft, Stettinius
& Hollister, 663 N.E.2d 1030 (Ohio App. 1995) (refusing claim based on municipal gay-rights ordi-
nance; public policy must be uniform statewide), appeal denied with dissent, 662 N.E.2d 22 (Ohio
1996), and Webb v. Puget Sound Broad. Co., 1998 Wash. App. LEXIS 1795, *8-9 (rejecting claim
based on municipal ordinance).
56. See Genna H. Rosten, Annotation, Wrongful Discharge Based on Public Policy Derived from
Professional Ethics Codes, 52 A.L.R.5th 405 (1997).
57. E.g., Drake v. Advance Construction Service, Inc., 117 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 1997) (applying Mis-
sissippi law) (refusing to submit false quality-control reports to U.S. Army Corps of Engineers); Wood-
son v. AMF Leisureland Centers, Inc., 842 F.2d 699 (3d Cir. 1988) (applying Pennsylvania law) (dis-
charging bartender for refusing to serve visibly intoxicated patron, in violation of state liquor code);
Webb v. HCA Health Serv., 780 S.W.2d 571 (Ark. 1989) (refusing to falsify medical records required
by Medicaid and Medicare); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980) (refusing to
participate in illegal price-fixing scheme); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100 (Colo. 1992)
(refusing to violate federal statute by providing NASA with false information regarding product quality
and pricing); Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 693 A.2d 293 (Conn. 1997) (refusing to defraud
U.S. government by using defective parts in helicopters produced for Army); Adams v. George W.
Cochran & Co., Inc., 597 A.2d 28 (D.C. 1991) (refusing to drive truck that lacked required inspection
sticker); Norris v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 842 P.2d 634 (Haw. 1992) (refusing to falsify airline mainte-
nance records in violation of FAA regulations); McClanahan v. Remington Freight Lines, Inc., 517
N.E.2d 390 (Ind. 1988) (refusing to drive truck over legal weight limit); DeRose v. Putnam Mgmt. Co.,
496 N.E.2d 428 (Mass. 1986) (refusing to testify falsely at criminal trial); Trombetta v. Detroit, T. & 1.
R.R., 265 N.W.2d 385 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (refusing to falsify pollution control records in violation of
state law); Coman v. Thomas Manufacturing Co., Inc., 381 S.E.2d 445 (N.C. 1989) (refusing to violate
federal regulations by driving truck excessive hours and falsifying records); Todd v. Frank's Tong
Service, Inc., 784 P.2d 47 (Okla. 1989) (refusing to drive truck with defective brakes, headlights, and
turn signals, in violation of state law); Anderson v. Evergreen International Airlines, Inc., 886 P.2d 1068
(Or. Ct. App. 1994) (refusing to use defective parts in defendant's aircraft, and refusing to cover up
safety violations); Strange v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 867 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (applying
Pennsylvania law and refusing to follow illegal "redlining" practices); Dugan v. Bell Telephone of
Pennsylvania, 876 F. Supp. 713 (W.D. Penn. 1994) (applying Pennsylvania law and refusing to partici-
pate in destruction of records subpoenaed by state legislature); Reynolds v. Ozark Motor Lines, Inc.,
887 S.W.2d 822 (Tenn. 1994) (refusing to violate laws requiring trucks be inspected for safety viola-
tions before driving); Nguyen v. Technical and Scientific Application, Inc., 981 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1998) (refusing to violate federal criminal copyright laws); Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280
(Utah 1992) (refusing to falsify tax and customs documents); Collins v. Elkay Mining Co., 371 S.E.2d
46 (W. Va. 1988) (refusing to falsify mine safety reports and refusing to violate mine safety laws);
Kempfer v. Automated Finishing, Inc., 564 N.W.2d 692 (Wis. 1997) (refusing to drive delivery truck
without proper licensing).
58. E.g., Liberatore v. Melville Corp., 168 F.3d 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (reporting to management
that temperature control problems in pharmacy produced adulterated drugs, and threatening to report
same to Food and Drug Administration); Paolella v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 158 F.3d 183 (3d Cir. 1998)
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(applying Delaware law and protesting employer's scheme of fraudulently billing clients); Sheets v.
Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385 (Conn. 1980) (reporting to superiors that food products were
being falsely and misleadingly labeled, in violation of state's Uniform Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act);
Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876 (Il1. 1981) (supplying police with information about
co-employee's criminal activities, and agreeing to testify regarding same); Palmer v. Brown, 752 P.2d
685 (Kan. 1988) (disclosing allegedly improper medicaid billing practices); Willard v. Paracelsus Health
Care Corp., 681 So. 2d 539 (Miss. 1996) (reporting forgery by employer's administrator); Olinger v.
General Heating & Cooling Co., 896 S.W.2d 43 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (reporting employer's mail fraud
to FBI, and cooperating with investigation); Howard v. Waremart, Inc., 935 P.2d 432 (Or. Ct. App.
1997) (reporting to senior management that immediate supervisor was selling mislabeled, spoiled meat
to supermarket customers); Ganer v. Morrison Knudsen Corp., 456 S.E.2d 907 (S.C. 1995) (reporting
unsafe working conditions and radioactive contamination to government and news media, and voluntar-
ily testifying to nuclear safety board about same); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va.
1978) (reporting illegal bank overcharges of customers, and cooperating with auditors regarding same);
Hausman v. St. Croix Care Ctr., 571 N.W.2d 393 (Wis. 1997) (reporting abuse and neglect of nursing
home patients).
Many states have enacted statutes to prohibit retaliation against whistleblowers. There are also fed-
eral provisions protecting whistleblowers in certain circumstances. See supra note 23. Some of those
statutes, by their terms, include a prohibition against retaliation that violates public policy (e.g., New
Jersey's Conscientious Employee Protection Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-3, and Montana's Wrongful
Discharge from Employment Act of 1987, MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(1)).
59. E.g., Lara v. Thomas, 512 N.W.2d 777 (Iowa 1994) (filing claim of partial unemployment in-
surance when plaintiff's hours were cut); Willoughby v. Gencorp., Inc., 809 S.W.2d 858 (Ky. Ct. App.
1990) (collecting temporary disability benefits); Ambroz v. Comhusker Square Ltd., 416 N.W.2d 510
(Neb. 1987) (refusing to take statutorily prohibited polygraph test ); Chapman v. Adia Services, Inc.,
688 N.E.2d 604 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (finding public policy in right to redress for injuries); Raykovitz
v. K Mart Corp., 665 A.2d 833 (Pa. Super. 1995) (firing part-time employee for filing for unemployment
insurance benefits after losing full-time job with other employer); Hume v. American Disposal Co., 880
P.2d 988, 993 (Wash. 1994) (asserting wage claim); McClung v. Marion County Comm'n, 360 S.E.2d
221 (W. Va. 1987) (filing action for wage and hour violations).
A frequent case of this type has been discharge in retaliation for filing a claim under a workers'
compensation statute. See Theresa Ludwig Kruk, Annotation, Recovery for Discharge from Employ-
ment in Retaliation for Filing Workers' Compensation Claim, 32 A.L.R. 4th 1221 (1984) and cases cited
therein. Many states now have anti-retaliation provision in their workers' compensation statutes. Id. In
some of those states, the statutory remedy is by its terms exclusive. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-
107(e).
60. E.g., Fredrick v. Simmons Airlines, Inc., 144 F.3d 500 (7th Cir. 1998) (applying Illinois law
and discussing publicly safety problems of employer's aircraft); Girgenti v. Cali-Con, Inc., 544 A.2d
655 (Conn. Ct. App. 1988) (firing movie projectionist for turning on lights during movie, emptying
theater, to aid police in looking for burglar); Washington v. Guest Services, Inc., 718 A.2d 1071 (D.C.
1998) (trying to stop co-employee from spraying poisonous cleaning fluid next to uncovered food to be
served in retirement home, and reporting same to employer); Carl v. Children's Hosp., 702 A.2d 159
(D.C. 1997) (testifying before legislature regarding tort reform, taking position adverse to employer, and
appearing as expert witness in medical malpractice trial); Cloutier v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,
Inc., 436 A.2d 1140 (N.H. 1981) (refusing to force employees to make bank deposits under dangerous
conditions); Babick v. Oregon Arena Corp., 160 Ore. App. 140 (1999) (firing employee for arresting
concertgoers committing crimes because arrests made for bad press for arena); Ludwick v. This Minute
of Carolina, Inc., 337 S.E.2d 213 (S.C. 1985) (obeying subpoena); Gardner v. Loomis Armored Inc.,
913 P.2d 377 (Wash. 1996) (firing armored car driver/guard for violating company rule by leaving ar-
mored truck to assist citizen in danger).
These cases have often involved retaliation for serving jury duty. E.g., Call v. Scott Brass, Inc., 553
N.E.2d 1225 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990); Shaffer v. Frontrunner, Inc., 566 N.E.2d 193 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990);
Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 386 A.2d 119 (Pa. Super.
1978); Hodges v. S.C. Toof& Co., 833 S.W.2d 896 (Tenn. 1992). Of course, cases allowing a claim for
discharge in retaliation for complying with a summons for jury duty or a subpoena can also be classed
with claims of employees fired for refusing to do illegal acts, in that refusing to comply with such direc-
tives by the court is unlawful. As Professor Rothstein points out, not all cases fit neatly into categories.
See ROTHSTEIN, ET. AL., supra note 23, § 9.9.
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Not all states, however, have allowed claims on all these grounds, and the
courts often take different approaches even to the same type of claims. For ex-
ample, some courts have held that the public policy exception will protect an
employee who is fired for refusing to perform an unlawful act only if such
conduct would expose the employee to criminal penalties. 61 Certain courts
will allow only whistleblowers who first report illegal conduct to governmental
authorities to pursue a public policy claim while others will protect an em-
ployee who makes a report only within the company.62 And indeed, some
courts will not allow the claim when the employee was under no legal duty to
act.
63
Courts differ as to when a statute (such as one prohibiting discrimination or
protecting whistleblowers) will preclude a common law public policy claim.
Even if a court concludes that the legislature in enacting a particular statute did
not intend to preempt the common law public policy claim, it still might decide
that the remedy provided by the statute makes a common law claim unneces-
sary.
64
Some courts have permitted plaintiffs to pursue claims for retaliation that
61. E.g., Guthrie v. Tifco Industries, 941 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying Texas law and denying
claim to employee terminated for refusing to violate customs regulations, because such violation does
not carry criminal penalties); Miller v. Fairfield Communities, Inc., 382 S.E.2d 16, 19 (S.C. Ct. App.
1989) (refusing to expand the public policy exception "outside the sphere of criminal sanctions"); Han-
cock v. Express One Int'l, Inc., 800 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (denying claim to airline pilot
fired for refusing to fly under conditions violating FAA regulations, because noncompliance with regu-
lations carried only civil penalties); Medina v. Lanabi Inc., 855 S.W.2d 161 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (de-
nying claim to apartment managers fired for refusing to discriminate against tenants based on race, be-
cause such conduct would not subject plaintiffs to criminal penalties); Brierty v. Dooley Helicopters,
Inc., No. H-92-3956, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16332 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 1993) (applying Texas law and
denying claim by helicopter pilots terminated for refusing to fly helicopters not maintained per federal
standards, because by so flying, plaintiffs were not risking criminal penalties; only had they actually
killed, injured, or endangered someone would they have been criminally liable!); see Andrews v. Bon
Secours-St. Mary's Hospital of Richmond, 43 Va. Cir. 486 (1997) (denying claim for nurse terminated
for her objections to concealing sexual assault of psychiatric patient, including denying victim food and
water, until hospital inspectors left, because failure to object would not have subjected plaintiff to crimi-
nal sanctions).
62. ROTHSTEIN, ET. AL., supra note 23, § 9.12 (permitting employees to invoke the public policy
exception for internal reporting would allow employers an opportunity to cure potential problems by
taking steps internally).
63. E.g., Smith v. Calgon Carbon Corp., 917 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1990) (applying Pennsylvania law
and denying relief to employee reporting to management employer's pollution of air and water as pollu-
tion control was not the employee's responsibility); Brown v. Hammond, 810 F. Supp. 644 (E.D. Pa.
1993) (applying Pennsylvania law and denying claim to paralegal terminated for informing authorities
and clients of employer's improper billing practices; court finding that it was not plaintiff's job to report
such misconduct); Hennessy v. Santiago, 709 A.2d 1269 (Pa. Super. 1998) (denying claim for coun-
selor at residence for mentally retarded terminated for assisting resident in pressing rape complaint
against another resident, where the court found plaintiff was not required by law to help victim); see
Hausman v. St. Croix Care Ctr., 571 N.W.2d 393 (Wis. 1997) (allowing claim by nurse/social worker
fired for reporting abuse and neglect of nursing home patients, but only because plaintiff had affirmative
duty by statute to make such report).
64. Courts vary on how they approach cases in which common law claims and statutory schemes
overlap. See INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS MANUAL (BNA) 527:118-22 (1998) (and cases cited
therein); ROTHSTEIN, ET. AL., supra note 23, § 9.21; ROTHSTEIN AND LIEBMAN, supra note 23, at 927.
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falls short of termination.65 Some cases have extended the protection to em-
66ployees who are by contract subject to discharge only for just cause. Others
have limited the public policy exception to at-will arrangements.
67
The opinions often focus on whether the termination implicates public con-
cerns or whether it is merely an issue of private concerns. The California Su-
preme Court, for example, said in Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. that what is
vindicated through such a wrongful discharge action "is not the terms or
promises arising out of the particular employment relationship involved, but
rather the public interest in not permitting employers to impose as a condition
of employment a requirement that an employee act in a manner contrary to
fundamental public policy." 68 The Foley court framed the question as
"whether the discharge is against public policy and affects a duty which inures
to the benefit of the public at large rather than to a particular employer or em-
ployee."
69
65. E.g., Holland v. Hardee's Food Systems, Inc., 853 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (applying
Pennsylvania law and seeking claim for termination of benefits); Garcia v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 232
Cal. Rptr. 490 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (dealing with suspension and demotion); Brigham v. Dillon Cos.,
Inc., 935 P.2d 1054 (Kan. 1997) (dealing with demotion). See Mark A. Rothstein, Wrongful Refusal to
Hire: Attacking the Other Half of the Employment-at- Will Rule, 24 CONN. L. REV. 97, 123 (1991), who
makes the case for allowing a public policy-based tort action for refusal to hire in certain circumstances,
and Mark Berger, Unjust Dismissal and the Contingent Worker: Restructuring Doctrine for the Re-
structured Employee, 16 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 1, 51 (1997), who advocates application of the public
policy exception to cases of nonrenewal of an employment contract where there has been a pattern of
renewal.
66. E.g., Davies v. American Airlines, Inc., 971 F.2d 463, 469 (10th Cir. 1992) (applying Okla-
homa law and observing "when an employer discharges an employee in violation of... public policy,
society is equally aggrieved whether the employee is 'at will' or can be discharged only for 'just
cause."'); Koehrer v. Superior Court, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820, 826 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) ("The theoretical
reason for labeling the discharge wrongful ... is not based on the terms and conditions of the contract,
but rather arises out of a duty implied in law on the part of the employer to conduct its affairs in compli-
ance with public policy... We focus on the public policy aspect of the wrongful discharge tort in hold-
ing that the cause of action does not depend on the contractual status of the employment relationship.");
Ewing v. Koppers Co., Inc., 537 A.2d 1173 (Md. 1988) ("[P]articular vulnerability of at will employees
... was only one of the factors considered by the Court [in recognizing the public policy exception]....
The public policy component of the tort is significant, and recognition of the availability of this cause of
action to all employees, at will and contractual, will foster the State's interest in deterring particularly
reprehensible conduct. Moreover, it would be illogical to deny the contract employee access to the
courts equal to that afforded the at will employee."); Retherford v. AT&T Communications, 844 P.2d
949, 960 (Utah 1992) ("A primary purpose behind giving employees a right to sue for discharges in
violation of public policy is to protect the vital state interests embodied in such policies."); Wilson v.
City of Monroe, 943 P.2d 1134, 1136 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) ("[Plaintiffs] right to be free from
wrongful termination in contravention of public policy may not be altered or waived by private agree-
ment, and is therefore a nonnegotiable right. Furthermore, the right does not originate in the [collective-
bargaining agreement] provision that requires just cause for termination, or depend on interpretation of
the CBA-the right is independent of any contractual agreement between [plaintiff and defendant].")
(footnotes omitted).
67. E.g., Silva v. Albuquerque Assembly & Distribution Freeport Warehouse Corp., 738 P.2d 513,
515 (N.M. 1987) ("Obviously, if an employee is protected from wrongful discharge by an employment
contract, the intended protection afforded by the retaliatory discharge action is unnecessary and inappli-
cable.").
68. 765 P.2d 373, 377 n.7 (1988).
69. Id. at 379.
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More recently, in Collier v. Superior Court,70 the California Court of Ap-
peal allowed a claim made by an employee who was fired for reporting (inter-
nally) that co-employees were engaged in various illegal conduct, including
bribery, kickbacks, embezzlement, tax evasion, and price fixing. 71 The court
focused on the costs to third parties, recognizing that "the circle of harm re-
sulting from the alleged wrongdoing encompassed far more than the purely
private interest of petitioner's employer." 72 In the same vein, the Arizona Su-
preme Court said in Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital,73 that only
those pronouncements of public policy that "have a singularly public purpose"
will provide the basis for a wrongful discharge claim.74 "Where the interest
involved is merely private or proprietary, the exception does not apply."
75
Distinguishing the public's interests from the "merely private or proprie-
tary" is not easy. One can say that a single unemployed individual has an ef-
fect, however minimal, on the economy.76 All public policy cases that courts
have permitted to go forward are thus in some way "public. ' 77 But in some
cases, the public's interests are more directly or more immediately implicated
than in others. Consider the worker who is dismissed for refusing to drive a
truck with bad brakes. The most immediate interest at stake is highway safety,
a policy that transcends the employment relationship. The public policy excep-
tion in this case is designed to counteract the externalities of the traditional
terminable-at-will rule, that is, the costs to society of giving free rein to em-
ployers to discharge for any reason.78 The objective in this case "is not the
protection of the individual worker per se, ' 79 but the benefit to the community
of having only safe vehicles on the road.
Now consider the case of the worker fired in retaliation for filing a work-
70. 279 Cal. Rptr. 453 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
71. Id. at 455.
72. Id. at 456.
73. 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985).
74. Id. at 1034. The Wagenseller decision preceded the Arizona legislature's enactment of the Ari-
zona Employment Protection Act, which abolished the common law public policy claim. See supra note
29.
75. 710P.2dat 1034.
76. Brian Berger discusses the societal costs arising from job insecurity and unemployment in
Note, Defining Public Policy Torts in At- Will Dismissals, 34 STAN. L. REV. 153, 168-69 (1981). Lisa
B. Bingham points out that even the classic case of retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim
implicates more than the employee's private right, in that the state has an interest in minimizing work-
place injuries and maintaining records regarding occupational safety and health. Employee Free Speech
in the Workplace: Using the First Amendment as Public Policy for Wrongful Discharge Actions, 55
OHIO ST. L.J. 341, 381 (1994).
77. Stewart J. Schwab criticizes the public-or-private language as unhelpful. He argues that a better
way to approach this type of wrongful discharge case is by "recalling a central purpose of tort law - to
control the adverse effect on third parties created by contracting parties." Wrongful Discharge Law and
the Search for Third-Party Effects, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1943, 1945 (1996).
78. Jeffrey L. Harrison, The Price of the Public Policy Modification of the Terminable-at-Will Rule,
34 LAB. L.J. 581, 582 (1983).
79. Id.
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ers' compensation claim. Courts allow a public policy claim in such cases to
give effect to the respective workers' compensation statutes. In one of the ear-
liest cases allowing a claim of wrongfil discharge for violation of public pol-
icy, the Indiana Supreme Court recognized that the fear of being discharged for
filing a claim "would have a deleterious effect on the exercise of a statutory
right. Employees will not file claims for justly deserved compensation -
opting, instead, to continue their employment without incident. The end result,
of course, is that the employer is effectively relieved of his obligation." 80 To-
ward the same goal of promoting compliance with worker-protection laws,
employees have also successfully invoked the public policy exception after
being discharged for exercising rights under other laws, such as those setting
wages and hours and prohibiting polygraphs.
81
Both the employee fired for refusing to drive an unsafe truck and the em-
ployee fired for filing a workers' compensation claim are entitled to invoke the
public policy exception, though not exactly for the same reason. 82 In both
cases, there are public interests at stake. In the workers' compensation case,
the primary goal is to give effect to an employee's rights under a worker-
protection law, while in the case of the dangerous truck, the most immediate
concern is protecting the traveling public from harm.
83
III. THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION AND THE INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
An independent contractor is one who renders service to another, but who
follows the hiring party's direction only as to the results of work, and not as to
the means by which it is to be accomplished. 84 "When one thinks of an inde-
pendent contractor relationship, one normally thinks of one firm hiring a sec-
ond firm-with its own staff, equipment, and resources-to do certain work,
instead of having its own employees do it."85 Alternatively, an independent
contractor might be a self-employed individual hired to do a job. The term
80. Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 427 (Ind. 1973). Accord, Firestone
Textile Co. Div. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730, 734 (Ky. 1983) ("The only effective way to prevent an
employer from interfering with his employees' rights to seek compensation is to recognize that the latter
has a cause of action for retaliatory discharge when the discharge is motivated by the desire to punish
the employee for seeking the benefits to which he is entitled by law.").
81. See supra note 59.
82. See Mark Pettit, Jr., Freedom, Freedom of Contract, and the "Rise and Fall, " 79 B.U.L. REV.
263, 298 (1999) (noting that some public policy limitations on the freedom of contract are intended to
protect specific third parties or classes of people, while others are intended to protect society generally).
83. Of course, the line between the two cases is not bright. The highway safety laws will also pro-
tect the truck-driving employee. And the workers' compensation system affects not only the injured
worker, but co-workers, family, and, to the extent the injured worker without benefits might become a
public charge, the welfare system.
84. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 774 (7th ed. 1999).
85. COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS §5 (May 1994) available at
http://www.doL.gov/dol/ sec/public/media/reports/dunlop/section5.htm [hereinafter DUNLOP REPORT].
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"independent contractor" is used broadly herein to include both firms and indi-
viduals. Most of the relevant case law, however, has involved individual con-
tractors.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that about 8.5 million individual
workers, 6.7 percent of the U.S. workforce, are independent contractors.
8 6
Many are contractors because they enjoy the flexibility of self-employment;
others are dissatisfied and would prefer employment. 87 There is little official
data on the trend of using independent contractors instead of employees. 8 Yet,
there is at least a perception that more companies are classifying workers as
independent contractors, often terminating employees, and hiring them back as
independent contractors, with the same job duties, but no benefits and some-
times lower pay.
89
Independent contractors are generally not covered by protective labor leg-
islation, such as anti-discrimination statutes and wage and hour laws.90 A hir-
ing entity does not have to pay social security, Medicare, or federal unem-
ployment insurance taxes on behalf of independent contractors. Nor do
employers need to withhold federal income taxes for independent contractors.
As contemporary working arrangements become increasingly more varied,
classifying such relationships becomes more difficult. There is no convenient
bright-line test to differentiate employees from independent contractors. A va-
riety of methods, none of them easy to use, have been developed to define
"employee" in different contexts.9 1
86. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CONTINGENT AND ALTERNATIVE
EMPLOYMENT ARRANGEMENTS (1997). The Bureau of Labor Statistics recognized, however, the diffi-
culty of distinguishing independent contractors and employees. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FUTUREWORK:
TRENDS AND CHALLENGES FOR WORK IN THE 21 ST CENTURY § 7 (1999) [hereinafter FUTUREWORK].
87. Susan N. Houseman, Flexible Staffing Arrangements § 5 (1999) available at
http://www.dol.gov/dol/asp/public/futurework/conference/staffingtoc.htm.
88. Seeld. at§4.
89. See DUNLOP REPORT, supra note 85, at 35; Lewis L. Maltby & David C. Yamada, Beyond
"Economic Realities ": The Case for Amending Federal Employment Discrimination Laws to Include
Independent Contractors, 38 B.C. L. REV. 239, 245-46 (1997); Lisa Stansky, Changing Shifts, A.B.A.
J., June 1997, at 55, 56-57; Steven Greenhouse, Item in Tax Bill Poses Threat to Job Benefits,
N.Y.TMES, July 20, 1997, at At 8. In a high-profile case, workers at Microsoft sued the company for
denial of benefits because of such misclassification. Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F.3d 1187 (9th
Cir. 1996), rev'den banc, 120 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1098 (1998).
The number of such suits appears to be growing, with workers suing for denial of benefits, denial of
overtime pay, and denial of reimbursement of business expenses based on their companies misclassifi-
cation of them as independent contractors. See Andrea Foster, Congress Eyes Contractor Issue, NAT'L
L.J., June 28, 1999, at B1.
90. A possible exception is 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which prohibits intentional discrimination on the
basis of race or ethnicity in the making of contracts. The application of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is not by its
terms limited to employees. See Maltby & Yamada, supra note 89, at 256-59 (discussing the possibili-
ties and limitations for independent contractors bringing claims based on violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
At least one state anti-discrimination law also covers independent contractors. See, e.g., Marquis v. City
of Spokane, 922 P.2d 43 (Wash. 1996) (holding that state's anti-discrimination statute applies to inde-
pendent contractors).
91. Anthony P. Carnevale, et al., Contingent Workers and Employment Law, in CONTINGENT
WORK 281, 286-91 (Kathleen Barker & Kathleen Christensen eds., 1998); Maltby & Yamada, supra
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In a growing number of cases, plaintiffs have asked courts to apply the
public policy exception to discharges of independent contractors. Most courts
have refused, although few state high courts have decided the issue. Little is
said in some of these decisions about the public's respective interests. Instead,
the courts to date generally have decided these cases by first determining the
employment status of the respective plaintiffs. If the court decides the plaintiff
was an employee, it will then proceed to examine the public policy question.
If, on the other hand, the court decides that the plaintiff was not an employee,
the plaintiff loses, cutting off further consideration of the public's interest in
the case. Thus, with few exceptions, the courts' decisions have turned on the
employment status of the plaintiff, rather than the underlying public policy at
issue. Courts on that basis have denied relief to independent contractors termi-
nated, for example, for refusing to engage in bribery, refusing to violate liquor
laws, and objecting to illegal accounting practices.
92
Many of the cases in which this question has been raised have been diver-
sity cases brought in federal courts, which are reluctant to set precedent on is-
sues of state common law. Not all the cases considering the issue are officially
published. The cases considering this issue tend to be brief, sometimes terse,
and many provide little or no rationale for their conclusions. Of the cases that
do provide some kind of analysis, some deny the claim, at least in part, because
independent contractors have greater control over their jobs than employees
do.93 At least one court was concerned about a potential threat to commercial
stability should non-employees be availed of such a cause of action.
94
IV. A SOURCE-DERIVATIVE APPROACH TO DECIDING WHO MAY BRING A
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CASE BASED ON PUBLIC POLICY VIOLATION
When courts deciding wrongful termination cases based on violation of
public policy fixate on the plaintiffs employment status, they often lose sight
of the public's interests. At the same time, the cause of action should not nec-
essarily be available to independent contractors in every case.
In deciding whether an independent contractor should be permitted to in-
voke the claim in a particular case, the court should first look at the source of
public policy the plaintiff has identified. What is the specific policy at issue?
What would be the justification for applying the exception to an employee un-
der the same facts? Is the public policy one of protecting employees because
of their status as employees? Let us assume, for example, that the expression
note 89, at 250-52.
92. See infra notes 135, 148-55 and accompanying text.
93. E.g., Premier Wine & Spirits v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 846 F.2d 537, 540 (9th Cir. 1988) (ap-
plying California law); Sistare-Meyer v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 58 Cal. App. 4th 10, 16 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1997); MacDougall v. Weichert, 677 A.2d 162, 166 (N.J. 1996).
94. Harris v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 14 Cal. App. 4th 70, 82 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
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of public policy in a given case is a statute. What is the purpose of the statute?
Was it enacted to protect employees, as such? Or was the broader purpose to
protect some public good that is not dependent on an employment relationship
between the parties?
If the underlying source for the public policy was enacted to protect em-
ployees, as employees, then the independent contractor should not be able to
use it as the sole basis for a wrongful discharge claim. Suppose, for example,
that an independent contractor is terminated because he refuses to take a poly-
graph test, and the only relevant source of public policy is a state statute pro-
hibiting such tests. We need to look at that statute to determine whether it was
enacted to protect employees, or whether it has a broader purpose. If the stat-
ute by its terms is limited to employees, and the plaintiff is not an "employee"
as it is defined under that statute, then the plaintiff should not be able to rely on
that enactment as the basis for a wrongful termination claim. Assume, how-
ever, that an independent contractor's services are terminated because she re-
fuses to commit perjury in litigation involving the company. The underlying
source of public policy would be the criminal statute prohibiting pejury. Such
a statute was not enacted to protect employees, but rather to prevent people
from lying under oath. While it will have a tangential effect on employees
(employees, like everyone one, are required to obey the law), it is not an em-
ployee-protection measure. In such cases where the underlying source is not
an employee-protection measure, there is no principled reason to deny the
contractor-plaintiff relief; such cases should be decided without regard to the
plaintiffs employment status.
This approach directs the inquiry to the purpose of the underlying source,
rather than the parties' relationship. 95 An independent contractor with an in-
definite arrangement should be permitted to bring a wrongful termination claim
based on a public policy violation when the underlying source of public policy
is not dependent on employment status. Independent contractors with a con-
tract for a definite period or for termination only for just cause should be per-
mitted to bring such a claim if in that jurisdiction an employee working under
those terms would be permitted to do so.
A. Using a Source-Derivative Approach TReconsider the Cases Deciding
Whether Independent Contractors May Bring a Wrongful Termination
Claim for Violation of Public Policy
How would the cases considering this issue have been decided using a
source-derivative approach? While this approach differs from that taken by
most courts to date, the results in many of those cases would not differ.
The following Sections discuss and reconsider two groups of cases that
95. See Pettit, supra note 82, at 298.
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have decided whether independent contractors may bring wrongful discharge
claims based on a public policy violation. In the first group are cases that, for
the most part, decide the issue based on employment status, but whose results
would probably be the same using a source-derivative approach. That is, re-
gardless of employment status, the plaintiff would have probably lost on a the-
ory of public policy violation. In the second group are claims that probably
would have been allowed to proceed under a source-derivative approach.
96
Group I: Claims that likely fail regardless ofplaintif's employment status
The cases presenting weak factual bases for a public policy claim fail re-
gardless of employment status. For example, the court in Ambrosino v. Metro-
politan Life Insurance Co.,97 refused to allow a claim by a doctor terminated
because of his past chemical dependency. Ambrosino was a podiatrist who had
entered into a participating-physician agreement with the defendant in 1990.
The agreement designated Ambrosino as an independent contractor, and al-
lowed termination at will by either party with thirty days notice. The agree-
ment would also terminate automatically if the physician were placed on pro-
bation, reprimanded, or fined by an agency with disciplinary authority over the
physician.98 In 1994, the Board of Podiatric Medicine placed Ambrosino on
probation for six years because of a short-term dependency on demerol in 1991
and his conduct during that period of dependency. That conduct included see-
ing patients while under the influence of demerol and using dermerol pre-
scribed for his patients. 99 The defendant terminated its agreement with Am-
brosino, who sued on several theories, including a claim based on violation of
public policy. He argued that the state had a public policy of encouraging the
rehabilitation of persons with chemical dependencies. The court granted sum-
mary judgment on the public policy claim because Ambrosino was an inde-
pendent contractor. The district court cited to state cases denying the public
policy claim to independent contractors, but otherwise did not discuss the rea-
sons for distinguishing the plaintiff based on employment status. The court in
Ambrosino based its decision on the plaintiffs employment status. But the
doctor's claim would likely have failed even if he had been an employee be-
cause courts have generally denied protection under a public policy theory to
employees terminated for their efforts at rehabilitation.
100
96. I recognize the limitations of looking at cases through a different lens than that used by the par-
ties and the courts. Had the cases been approached the way I would have approached them, for exam-
ple, the parties might have briefed them differently, and the opinions might have included more detail
about the underlying sources of public policy.
97. 899 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
98. Id. at 440.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 58 Cal. App. 4th 938 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (denying
claim to employee fired because of her voluntary participation in drug/alcohol rehabilitation program);
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In Kozera v. Connecticut Motor Club, Inc.,'0 a Connecticut case, the
plaintiff was an independent contractor who had an agreement with the defen-
dant to provide roadside assistance to its members. The agreement was termi-
nable by either party on seven days notice. The motor club canceled the con-
tract when a local newspaper ran an article announcing that plaintiff had been
arrested. (The opinion does not say what the charge was.) Kozera sued for
wrongful termination of the agreement in violation of public policy. The court
decided that the plaintiff could not invoke the claim because it did not apply
outside the employment context. But Kozera probably would have lost even if
he had been an employee, in that the courts have generally found that the pre-
sumption of innocence accorded criminal defendants does not suffice as an ex-
pression of public policy in wrongful discharge cases. 102
In Shah v. New England Life Insurance Co., 103 the plaintiff was an inde-
pendent insurance agent who was fired for violating the rules of the National
Association of Securities Dealers, a false accusation according to the plaintiff.
The federal district court, applying Illinois law, granted defendant's motion to
dismiss solely on the ground that plaintiff, as an independent contractor, was
not entitled to the public policy claim. 1°4 Although the court decided the case
on the basis of Shah's employment status, the result was consistent with most
public policy cases brought by employees fired on the basis of false accusa-
tions of on-the-job misconduct. Such employees do not fare well under the
common law public policy theory, as courts typically find that there is no re-
quirement of due process before termination of private employees.'
0 5
Selofv. Island Foods, Inc., 623 N.E.2d 386 (Il1. Ct. App. 1993) (denying claim to employee fired be-
cause she sought treatment for alcoholism); Rothweil v. Wetterau, Inc., 820 S.W.2d 557 (Mo. App.
1991) (denying claim for employee discharged because of drug/alcohol addiction, employer having de-
nied request for rehabilitation). Whether an individual with a history of chemical or alcohol dependency
has a claim under a statute is a separate inquiry. John Ambrosino, for example, did have a viable claim
under a state anti-discrimination statute. 899 F. Supp. at 444-45.
101. No. CV94315537S, 1996 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1067 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 1996).
102. See, e.g., Kinoshita v. Canadian Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 803 F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying
Hawaii law) (disallowing common law public policy claim based on discharge following airline em-
ployees' arrest for drug dealing where the court found that plaintiffs were fired because of the percep-
tion that plaintiffs were involved in drug trade); Raffaele v. Ryder Dedicated Logistics, Inc., 931 F.
Supp. 76 (D. Mass. 1996) (applying Massachusetts law) (disallowing claim where truck driver was fired
for receiving a traffic citation, which he successfully challenged, while aiding stranded motorist);
Borschel v. City of Perry, 512 N.W.2d 565 (Iowa 1994) (rejecting public policy claim for police officer
charged with, but not convicted of, sexual abuse of daughter); Rank v. Township of Annville, 641 A.2d
667 (Pa. Commnw. Ct. 1994) (denying claim to employee fired because of charges of drug possession,
which were dismissed).
103. No. 98-C5355, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18509, at *4 (N.D. I11. Nov. 18, 1998).
104. Id.at*17.
105. See, e.g., Nunez v. Sahara Nevada Corp., 677 F. Supp. 1471 (D. Nev. 1988) (applying Nevada
law) (barring claim for employee fired based on accusation of misconduct where employee denied op-
portunity to confront accusers); Morris v. Hartford Courant Co., 513 A.2d 66 (Conn. 1986) (denying
claim to employee fired on basis of false allegations of misappropriating company funds, on the grounds
that false accusations of criminal activity did not implicate public policy); Zuniga v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 671 P.2d 662 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) (denying public policy claim to employee fired based on erro-
neous accusation of attempted theft); Gillespie v. St. Joseph's University, 513 A.2d 471 (Pa. Super. Ct.
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Similarly, the plaintiff in Ziehlsdorf v. American Family Insurance
Group'0 6 would likely not have succeeded in his claim even if he had been an
employee. In Ziehlsdorf the Wisconsin Court of Appeals considered the
wrongful termination case of an independent insurance agent who complied
with the insurance company's directive to stop writing insurance policies for
black customers and, as a result, failed to meet his minimum production re-
quirements. The court said that if the public policy exception is to be afforded
independent contractors, it was up to the state supreme court to do so. It de-
clined to discuss the matter further. The court began and ended the analysis
with the plaintiff's employment status. Instead, the case should have turned, as
it probably would have had Ziehlsdorf been an employee, on the fact that he
did not refuse to break the law or report the illegal practice.
The facts in Sammarco v. Anthem Insurance Cos., 107 where the firing of the
plaintiff-physicians was allegedly motivated by the defendant's desire to in-
crease profits, would not provide similarly-situated employees with a viable
public policy claim. Sammarco arose out of the merger of several health insur-
ance carriers and the subsequent termination of the plaintiffs' contracts as phy-
sician-providers for one of those carriers. The physicians sued for wrongful
termination of their contracts, which were terminable at will. One of the
claims was for violation of public policy, based on the plaintiffs' assertion that
they were terminated for no reason other than the insurance companies' profit
motive.'0 8 Although plaintiffs were clearly not employees, the court did not
dismiss their claim on that ground. Rather, the court dismissed the claim be-
cause the "plaintiffs have failed to identify any public policy in Ohio that dis-
courages businesses, even those in such public-welfare industries as health
care, from profiting or increasing their profits."109 Noting that the plaintiffs
had not alleged that patient care would be compromised by termination of their
contracts," 0 the court said that despite some limits on the freedom of insurers
to eliminate coverage in certain circumstances, "the free-market philosophy
reigns, and most likely will continue to reign as long as individuals have access
to adequate medical care-even if that care is not provided by a patient's first-
1986) (denying claim to employee fired as a result of false accusations of criminal conduct); Cisco v.
United Parcel Servs., Inc., 476 A.2d 1340, 1344 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (disallowing claim of employee
discharged based on charges of theft, which resulted in acquittal); Reninger v. State Dep't. of Correc-
tions, 951 P.2d 782, 787 (Wash. 1998) (en banc) (denying claim to corrections officers constructively
discharged as result of false accusations of leaving firearms unsecured, upon court finding that termina-
tion did not affect public collectively). But see, e.g., Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151,
165-67 (Utah 1991) (allowing claim by store employee fired and prosecuted for theft, even after guilty
party confessed, where public policy articulated in statute prohibiting false criminal accusations).
106. No. 89-2391, 1990 WL 149183, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Jul. 18, 1990), review denied, 461
N.W.2d 446 (Wis. 1990).
107. 723 N.E.2d 128 (1998).
108. Id. at 131-32.
109. 723 N.E.2d at 133-34.
110. Id. at 134.
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choice physician."' 1
Two of the factually weaker public policy claims made by independent
contractors involved terminations based on the contractors' business competi-
tion with the hiring parties. One of these was Cogan v. Harford Memorial
Hospital,'12 a case applying Maryland law. The defendant hospital contracted
with Cogan to act as Chief of Radiology. The contract was terminable by ei-
ther party on 120 days notice. When the plaintiff announced his intention to
open a competing radiology clinic, the hospital terminated the relationship.
Cogan sued on a number of theories, including a common law public policy
claim. The court granted defendant's summary judgment on that claim be-
cause Cogan was an independent contractor, not an employee. The court also
said, however, that regardless of his employment situation, there was no evi-
dence from which a jury could find any wrongful acts on the part of the hospi-
tal. The court did not provide any rationale for distinguishing between em-
ployees and independent contractors; it merely cited to other cases that had
come to the same conclusion on this question. Yet the result in Cogan was
consistent with precedents where the plaintiffs were employees. An employee
who announces an intention to open a business to compete with the employer is
unlikely to be successful on a public policy claim.
Another case involving competition with the hiring company was a Mis-
souri case, Princess House, Inc. v. Lindsey.113 The plaintiff in that case manu-
factured and sold crystal products through "home parties" in private homes.
Defendants were sales organizers for these parties. Sales organizers recruited
consultants - salespeople who demonstrated the merchandise and took orders
at parties. While still working for Princess House, defendants started working
for another company that sold products using the home party sales method.
Princess House terminated its relationships with defendants, and the break-up
resulted in protracted litigation between the parties. While one of the defen-
dants' twelve counterclaims was for wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy, their case was essentially one of breach of contract, apparently for dis-
continuing certain payments the company had been making to them as a cut of
the sales made by the consultants they had recruited. The court granted Prin-
cess House's motion for summary judgment on the public policy count because
it found no employment relationship. However, there were no facts on the face
of the opinion to indicate that the sales organizers would have had a viable
public policy argument even if they had been employees.
Some of the cases brought by independent contractors have involved alle-
gations of discrimination. Carney v. Dexter Shoe Co.,1 14 for example, was a
111. Id.
112. 843 F. Supp. 1013 (D. Md. 1994).
113. 918 F. Supp. 1356 (W.D. Mo. 1994), aff'd, 77 F.3d 486 (8th Cir. 1996).
114. 701 F. Supp. 1093 (D. N.J. 1988).
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New Jersey case of alleged age discrimination. George Carney was a 60-year-
old independent sales representative for defendant. When Dexter terminated
their relationship, Carney sued, alleging violation of federal and state anti-
discrimination statutes, and violation of public policy. The federal district
court decided that Carney was an independent contractor, not an employee.
The discrimination statutes by their terms covered only employees, so the court
granted defendant's summary judgment on those counts. The court also de-
cided that the decision to terminate Carney "had nothing to do with his acting
pursuant to a clear mandate of public policy" and thus failed as a matter of
law. 115 The court noted, too, that there was no New Jersey precedent for al-
lowing independent contractors to pursue common law public policy claims." 6
In another discrimination case, Robinson v. Ladd Furniture, Inc.,117 the
federal district court denied an independent contract's public policy claim un-
der both California and North Carolina law. Sam Robinson was a furniture
sales representative with a territory in California. He sold furniture manufac-
tured by defendant, a North Carolina company. Ladd Furniture terminated
Robinson and Robinson sued, alleging that his termination was based on age
discrimination, in violation of public policy.' 18 The court found that Robinson
was an independent contractor, and therefore was not entitled to invoke the
public policy exception under either California or North Carolina law.' 9 The
court's analysis of California law on this point was limited to its citation of
Harris v. Atlantic Richfield,120 wherein the California Court of Appeals denied
a public policy claim in a commercial contractual dispute.' 21 When examining
the question under North Carolina law, however, it did look at the federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act122 as a source of public policy.' 23 The
court decided that the ADEA by its terms clearly applies only to employees.
124
Therefore, an independent contractor could not base his public policy claim on
the ADEA.
The Idaho Supreme Court considered essentially the same question in Os-
trander v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. 25 Diane Ostrander, an inde-
115. Id. at 1103.
116. Id. at 1102.
117. 872 F. Supp. 248 (M.D. N.C. 1994).
118. Id. at 252. Robinson also alleged a violation of California's anti-discrimination statute. The
court decided that as an independent contractor, he was not covered by the statute. Id.
119. 1dat252-54.
120. 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 649 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
121. 872 F. Supp. at 253.
122. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
123. 872 F. Supp. at 253. It is not apparent from the opinion whether the plaintiff cited this source,
or any other source, of public policy in briefing this issue. The ADEA is, however, the only public pol-
icy source the court discussed in the opinion.
124. Id.
125. 851 P.2d 946 (Idaho 1993). Five years before Ostrander was decided, an independent insur-
ance agent had raised a public policy claim in Anderson v. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. of Idaho, Inc.,
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pendent insurance agent, filed a wrongful discharge claim alleging discrimina-
tion based on age and sex. One count of her complaint was for violation of
public policies embodied in federal and state anti-discrimination statutes. The
court decided that because Ostrander was not in the class of persons protected
by these statutes, she could not claim a public policy violation based on
them.
126
Using a source-derivative approach, the results in Robinson, Carney, and
Ostrander were probably correct, in that the plaintiffs apparently relied on as
expressions of public policy statutes that protect only employees.1 27 In Sistare-
Meyer v. Young Men's Christian Association, 128 however, the plaintiff in-
voked an anti-discrimination provision in a state constitution. Anna Maria
Sistare-Meyer entered into a contract with the defendant to provide dancing in-
struction at the YMCA. The contract was terminable at will with one week's
notice. When the defendant terminated the contract, Sistare-Meyer claimed
that her firing had been motivated by race discrimination. She sued on a num-
ber of theories, including one based on a violation of public policy. The plain-
tiff cited a provision of the California Constitution, which provides that "[a]
person may not be disqualified from entering or pursuing a business, profes-
sion, vocation, or employment because of sex, race, creed, color, or national or
ethnic origin."'1 29 In deciding whether the plaintiff-contractor was entitled to
invoke a public policy exception, the California Court of Appeal looked at the
source - the constitutional provision itself. However, the court stopped short
of a thorough review of the section's text and purpose. 130 Instead, it simply
732 P.2d 699 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987). The court found that the alleged reason for termination - selling
insurance policies from defendant's competitors - did not violate public policy, so it did not need to
decide whether the public policy exception might apply to independent contractors. The following year,
a case reached the Idaho Supreme Court in which the plaintiff, an independent insurance agent, was dis-
charged for refusing to change his part-time schedule to a full-time one and for consulting an attorney
regarding threatened termination. Clement v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 766 P.2d 768 (Idaho 1988). In a
split decision, the court found that no public policy was violated, and therefore did not directly address
the employer-contractor distinction. One concurring justice would have denied the plaintiff relief solely
because he was not an employee. Id. at 771-72. In a relatively lengthy and forceful dissent, another
justice wrote that he was unconvinced that there is any difference between independent contractors and
employees-at-will in cases of public policy violation or bad faith discharge (finding "no merit in a hair-
splitting distinction between bad faith and public policy exceptions in employment-at-will terminations
generally"). 766 P.2d at 775.
126. See Donald A. Mouton, Casenote and Comment: Ostrander v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance
Company: Why is the Idaho Supreme Court Providing No Recourse to Independent Contractors Dis-
charged in BadFaith?, 31 IDAHO L. REv. 353 (1994) (criticizing the decision and its lack of analysis).
127. Even employees with discrimination claims are often precluded from bringing common law
claims. See sources cited at supra note 64 and accompanying text.
128. 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 840 (Cal. Ct. App.1997).
129. Id. at 842 (quoting CAL. CONST. art. I, § 8). The court stressed that it was not deciding
whether the provision accords independent contractors constitutional rights against private parties with
whom they contract. Instead, it limited its inquiry to whether the provision expresses a public policy
against discrimination that would support a wrongful discharge claim for independent contractors. Id. at
842-43.
130. Id. at 843. The court's job in this endeavor was not made easier by the unresolved issue of
whether the provision covers private as well as state action. See Id.
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concluded that the provision was not a "sufficiently clear expression of a well
established policy against discrimination by persons who engage independent
contractors to perform work or services."'' 31 The court inferred from the provi-
sion that the policy against race discrimination must yield "in some circum-
stances to competing concerns about the general welfare."' 3 2 With that, the
court employed a balancing test: the constitutional policy against discrimina-
tion versus the competing policy concerns underlying the "long standing dis-
tinction between employees and independent contractors[.]' ' 133 The court ex-
plained that "[i]ndependent contractors typically have greater control over the
way in which they carry out their work than employees, and businesses assume
fewer duties with respect to independent contractors than employees. Thus, the
independent contractor status provides the hiring party and the worker with an
alternative relationship that gives each more freedom and flexibility than the
employer-employee relationship."' 34 A source-derivative analysis would have
required the court to delve into the purpose, scope, and coverage of the consti-
tutional provision offered by the plaintiff as the source of public policy. But
the court did not do so, instead detouring into a test that purported to balance
racial equality with a flexible work arrangement. Because the court did not ask
the right questions, it is unclear how Sistare-Meyer would have been decided
using a source-derivative approach.
The claims in the Group I cases discussed above probably would have
failed regardless of the respective plaintiffs' employment status. In the fol-
lowing cases, however, the result might have been different had the courts used
a source-derivative approach.
Group I." Claims that would likely be viable under a source-derivative
analysis
Those independent contractors terminated for refusing to do something
unlawful, or for reporting or objecting to unlawful activities present the strong-
est public policy cases; had they been employees, most courts would have al-
lowed their cases to proceed. Yet the courts have generally denied such claims
by independent contractors. In those cases, the courts typically focus on the
131. Id. at 843-44.
132. Id. at 844.
133. Id.
134. Id (citations omitted). The court also noted that independent contractors are generally not
covered by anti-discrimination statutes. Id. However, that fact is not relevant to the question of
whether the state constitution provides an expression of public policy sufficient to sustain a public pol-
icy claim.
In an earlier case, a federal district court applying California law denied without discussion of public
policy an independent contractor's common law claim for wrongful discharge based on age discrimina-
tion, finding that no such common law claim existed for such discrimination regardless of employment
status. Lumia v. Roper Pump Co., 724 F. Supp. 694, 697 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
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plaintiff s employment status, often ignoring the public policy at stake.
In New Horizons Electronics Marketing, Inc. v. Clarion Corp. of Amer-
ica, 135 for example, the court denied a cause of action to an independent sales
representative terminated allegedly for refusing to engage in bribery. The Illi-
nois trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on plain-
tiffs claim based on a public policy violation, concluding that the claim was
restricted to employees. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed the dismissal.
It said that the rationale underlying public policy exception is "based on the
recognition that 'employer and employee do not stand on equal footing,' and a
proper balance must be maintained among the employee's interest in operating
a business efficiently and profitably, the employee's interest in earning a live-
lihood and society's interest in seeing its public policies carried out."'136 The
court considered the dynamics of the employer-employee relationship, but
gave insufficient regard to the enforcement of the underlying source of public
policy-the statute prohibiting bribery.
The Illinois case of Driveaway and Truckaway Service, Inc. v. Aaron
Driveaway & Truckaway Co.137 also involved a plaintiff terminated allegedly
for refusing to break the law. The plaintiff had entered into an agency agree-
ment with a vehicle-transport company. The agent-plaintiff sued the principal
for terminating the agreement when the former refused to participate in illegal
schemes involving violations of the Illinois Commerce Commission regula-
tions, Interstate Commerce Commission requirements, and federal and state tax
laws. The federal district court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss be-
cause it decided that the public policy exception was available only to employ-
ees under Illinois law, and the plaintiff here was an agent, not an employee.
The court said that there was "no hint of unequal bargaining power between
[the parties].... This clearly was not a situation where the two parties did 'not
stand on equal footing' as in an employment at-will scenario."'138 The court
also noted "that the availability of a contractual remedy rather than the exis-
tence of one in fact is all that is required to find that a sufficient legal remedy
exists here."' 39 Though a similarly situated employee would have been al-
lowed to sue for tort damages in Illinois for a public policy violation, 14 thecourt decided that the contract remedy would suffice here. The court pre-
135. 561 N.E.2d 283 (I11. App. Ct. 1990), appeal denied, 567 N.E.2d 334 (I11. 991).
136. 561 N.E.2d at 285 (quoting Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (I11. 981)).
137. 781 F. Supp. 548 (N.D. 11. 1991).
138. Id. at 552 (quoting Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 878).
139. Id.
140. An action for wrongful discharge based on violation of public policy is a tort in Illinois. Kel-
say v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353 (I11. 978). Illinois courts have allowed employees terminable
only for cause to bring such an action, their remedies not limited to those under contract. Ryherd v.
General Cable Co., 530 N.E.2d 431, 435 (11. 1988) (stating that an employee's right to recover for re-
taliatory discharge "cannot be negotiated or bargained away").
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sumed, without indicating its basis, that "[a]gents who are wrongfully dis-
charged by their principals will routinely seek compensatory damages well
above those found in employer-employee discharge cases."141 That difference
in compensatory damages, the court concluded, would provide "sufficient de-
terrent against potential indiscretions by a principal. 142 Like the court in New
Horizons, the court in Driveaway gave short shrift to the enforcement of the
laws cited as the sources of public policy.
The court in Driveaway raised the issue of unequal bargaining power.
143
The court's implication (and assumption) was that contractors as a class were
on an equal footing with their hiring parties and did not need to be protected in
the way employees do. But to say that independent contractors enjoy equal
bargaining power with hiring parties is, at least, an overgeneralization. Not all
independent contractors are non-employees by choice. While some choose the
flexibility of contracting work, others do such work because they are unable to
find a company to hire them as employees. Many are contractors because they
were terminated as employees and rehired as contractors. 144 In the end, how-
ever, bargaining power should not determine the outcome of cases where the
purpose is to protect the public's interests. Courts often recognize limitations
on contracts for public-policy reasons that "touch upon matters of substance
related to the public welfare rather than aspects of the bargaining process be-
tween the parties."' 45 The primary concem in this type of wrongful discharge
cases must properly remain with societal or third-party interests.146 Even if the
141. 781 F. Supp. at 553.
142. Id.
143. 781 F. Supp. at 552 (stating that there is no hint of unequal bargaining power between the
parties). The court in Wilmington v. Harvest Insurance Cos., 521 N.E.2d 953 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) re-
fers to the public policy claim as one developed to protect employees. It, too, was presented with the
question of whether to apply the public policy exception to independent contractors. The court did not
reach that issue because it decided that whatever plaintiff's status, he did not have a valid claim. The
court did note however that the public policy exception "being humanitarian in purpose," did not apply
to independent contractors, but to employees only. Id. at 956.
144. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, ch. 8, Introductory Note (1981). The court in Ja-
cob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142 (N.J. 1992), for example, considered the validity of
a termination provision that barred departing members of a law firm from collecting severance compen-
sation if they continued to represent or solicit firm clients within one year of departure. The court held
the provision void as against public policy because it inhibited the clients' choice of counsel, not be-
cause of a disparity in the parties' relative bargaining positions. Id. at 150.
While bargaining power is not directly relevant in deciding whether public policy is implicated, it
might affect the number of cases in which the threat of retaliation is effective; where there is equal bar-
gaining power, presumably there is less leverage of the hiring party over the contractor and less likeli-
hood that the contractor would be put in the position of choosing between doing what is in the public's
interest and losing a contract.
146. Jeffrey L. Harrison makes the point that under the public policy rationale, "the focus is not on
protecting the employee's interest in employment expectations. Instead, the goal is primarily one of
protecting the public interest; benefits accruing to employees are incidental." Jeffrey L. Harrison, The
"New" Terminable-at- Will Employment Contract: An Interest and Cost Incidence Analysis, 69 IOWA L.
REv. 327, 351 (1984).
Few courts will admit to rationalizing an employee's wrongful discharge action on the grounds of
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contractor enjoys equal bargaining power with the hiring party, the contractor
might undervalue the public's interest. The contractor might decide that the
loss of this beneficial relationship with the other party is not worth pushing the
public's interest. (Presumably, the contractor is benefiting from the relation-
ship, or he would not be contracting with the other party.) We should also
want to provide an incentive for contractors to do what is in the public interest,
regardless of the parties' relative bargaining position.
47
Premier Wine & Spirits v. E. & J. Gallo Winery,148 a case applying Cali-
fornia law, involved the termination of a distributorship allegedly because the
distributor refused to violate the law. Premier, a wholesaler of liquor in South
Dakota, had an agreement to distribute Gallo's products to retailers. The
agreement was terminable by either party with 30 days notice. Premier alleged
that Gallo terminated the distributorship because Premier refused to engage in
"setting" of Gallo's products at the retail shops. The court described setting as
a wholesaler's practice of arranging the products of retailers in such a way that
the wholesaler's product gets favorable shelf location. The South Dakota At-
torney General had issued a directive to all liquor wholesalers in that state that
stocking shelves on behalf of a retailer constituted a form of kickback, "the of-
fering of something of financial value to induce the sale of an alcoholic bever-
age."'149 Premier had also entered into a consent order with the state of South
Dakota by which it was bound not to give kickbacks to retailers. Setting prod-
ucts would subject Premier to loss of its wholesale license (and, presumably,
contempt of court if such practice indeed violated the consent order). Premier
alleged that Gallo sought to have Premier set shelves in violation of the Attor-
ney General's directive and in apparent violation of the consent order; when
Premier refused, Gallo terminated the agreement. The federal district court
gave summary judgment for Gallo, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, deciding
that the California courts would not permit the public policy exception on these
facts. While it recognized that while the principle underlying the exception is
"logically capable of extension beyond the employment relation,"' 5 ° it rea-
soned that "there is a consideration that makes it peculiarly apt in that setting
unequal bargaining power. Professor Harrison observes that courts "traditionally have been reluctant to
speak directly to the issue of unequal bargaining power in any area of law, including the area of em-
ployment contracts." Id. at 355. Nevertheless, the perceived equal bargaining position has been cited as
a reason not to extend the public policy exception to independent contractors. E.g., Driveaway &
Truckaway Service, Inc. v. Aaron Driveaway & Truckaway Co., 781 F. Supp. 548, 552 (N.D. I11. 1991).
We cannot know how many other courts might have been silently influenced by concerns of bargaining
power in denying the public policy exception to independent contractors.
147. As Professor Harrison has said, the public policy basis for permitting wrongful discharge ac-
tions "could justify intrusion even in instances in which the employee willingly agrees to conditions for
continued employment that would be inconsistent with the interests of third parties." Harrison, supra
note 146, at 351.
148. 846 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1988).
149. Id. at 539.
150. Id. at 540.
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and not in a broader context: it is normal for an employee to take directions
from his employer. In the ordinary commercial world, the control of one
party's actions by another is not so usual or so close."' 151 Therefore, the court
concluded, "[i]t is hard to forecast that California would extend the principles
of [the public policy exception] to the relation of producer and nonexclusive
wholesaler."1
52
The result in Premier Wine & Spirits would likely have been different un-
der a source-derivative approach. If the defendant had discharged an employee
for refusing to violate liquor laws, the employee would probably have a public
policy claim.' 53 The liquor laws were not enacted to protect employees. If
they are worth enforcing by protecting employees who refuse to violate them,
then they are worth enforcing by protecting non-employees who do the same.
The court noted that hiring parties have less control over independent contrac-
tors than they do over employees, but did not explain why that difference in
control should preclude independent contractors as a class from pursuing pub-
lic policy claims.
Vista West, Inc. v. North American Philips Corp.154 was a case of alleged
whistleblowing decided under California law. Vista West distributed products
manufactured by the defendant, NAPC. The relationship between Vista West
and NAPC was governed by a series of written contracts providing that the
distributorship was terminable at will by either party with 30 days notice. In
Vista West's suit, it claimed that its distributorship was terminated because
Vista West had complained about the defendant's accounting practices, which
allegedly violated state and federal securities laws. (The opinion does not say
to whom the complaint was made.) The Ninth Circuit affirmed a grant of
summary judgment against Vista West, noting the lack of precedent for ex-
tending the cause of action outside the employment context in California.
55
The court did not discuss the underlying securities statutes in granting
summary judgment to the defendant. Presumably, however, the securities laws
were not written as employee-protection measures. If an employee-plaintiff
with the same discharge claim had been able to base a public policy claim on
these statutes, Vista West should have also been able to do so.
151. Id.
152. Id. The tone of the court's opinion suggests that it doubted Premier's story. The court noted
that Premier's current president testified in a deposition that he believed Gallo had terminated the dis-
tributorship because it wanted to be with another distributor, which was owned by a friend of the Gallo
family. Premier's general counsel provided similar testimony, and added that Premier's merchandising
manager and Gallo representatives did not work well together. Premier's former president had testified
that the breakup was because Premier had changed ownership. "However, Premier now argues that a
jury could infer that Premier was terminated for refusing to respond to Gallo's requests to set the shelves
of retailers." Id. at 539.
153. See supra note 57.
154. No. 87-2492, 1989 WL 52707 (9th Cir. May 15, 1989) (unpublished disposition).
155. Id. at*7-8.
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In another Califomia case, Brown v. Allstate Ins. Co.,156 the plaintiff was a
plumber who did contracting and insurance claim work for defendant. Allstate
terminated its relationship with Brown allegedly because he had objected to the
company's violations of the state insurance code. Brown sued for unlawful
termination, and Allstate filed a motion to dismiss. The federal district court
indicated that if plaintiff were an employee, his allegations would suffice to
survive the motion, but if an independent contractor, he would be out of luck.
The court denied defendant's motion to dismiss because plaintiffs status-"a
fundamental, dispositive factual dispute"157-still needed to be determined.
There is little background information in the Brown opinion. It provides no
additional information about the alleged insurance code violations or any other
aspects of the plaintiffs public policy claim, but the insurance code offered as
the source of public policy was a statute prohibiting unfair practices in the in-
surance business, not an employee-protection statute.158 Given that the court
had already decided that the policy underlying the insurance statute was worthy
of protection, there was no reason to distinguish Brown the employee from
Brown the independent contractor. Therefore, using a source-derivative ap-
proach, he should have been able to pursue his claim.
159
The issue of applying the public policy exception to independent contrac-
tors reached the Supreme Court of New Jersey in MacDougall v. Weichert.
160
John MacDougall, was a real estate sales associate for defendant, Weichert
Realtors, in its office in Chester, New Jersey. They had a written agreement
describing MacDougall as an independent contractor. The agreement was ter-
minable by either party upon written notice. MacDougall was also a member
of the Borough Council in Chester. As a member of the Council, MacDougall
voted for an ordinance that would ban parking in front of a building in town
that was owned by a long-time Weichert client. The client was unhappy about
the vote, and Weichert terminated MacDougall. MacDougall sued Weichert
for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. The trial granted
Weichert's motion for summary judgment, and MacDougall appealed. Two of
the issues the New Jersey Supreme Court had before it were (1) whether the
case involved a violation of public policy, and (2) whether MacDougall could
invoke the exception.
156. 17 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (S.D. Cal. 1998).
157. Id. at 1138.
158. CAL. INS. CODE § 790 (West 1993).
159. Birchem v. Knights of Columbus, 116 F.3d 310 (8th Cir. 1997) (applying North Dakota law)
was a similar case that might have been allowed to go forward had the plaintiff been an employee, al-
though the facts presented are incomplete. Keith Birchem was terminated allegedly because he had ac-
cused defendant's general insurance agent of improper trade practices. He sued for wrongful termina-
tion on a public policy theory, arguing that he was in fact an employee. He conceded that his retaliation
claim failed if he was an independent contractor. The court found he was an independent contractor and
he lost.
160. 677 A.2d 162 (N.J. 1996).
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John MacDougall offered two state statutes as sources of public policy to
support his claim. The first makes it a criminal offense to threaten harm indi-
rectly or directly to a public official to influence the offical's vote.' 6 1 The sec-
ond statute makes it a crime to harm someone in retaliation for her service as a
public servant. 162 In a fractured opinion, the court decided that these statutes
prohibiting the improper influence of public officials "are the source of a clear
mandate of public policy that serves to protect an employee from the threat or
infliction of unlawful harm that is intended to influence his or her official ac-
tion as an elected legislative representative. ,163 The court also looked to con-
flict-of-interest laws, which demand that an officeholder discharge duties with
undivided loyalty. 164 The court found that such conflict-of-interest laws "not
only impose duties on public employees but they also constitute constraints on
persons dealing with public employees. These laws give added substantive
meaning and lend strength to the clear mandate of public policy that has its ba-
sic source in the laws that proscribe harmful conduct directed at public offi-
cials."'
165
The court remanded the case to the trial court to decide "the issue of
whether Weichert's conduct in terminating plaintiffs employment was based
on interests or relationships that would constitute an impermissible conflict of
interest and may have offended the standards that govern conflicts interest
[sic], thereby violating a clear mandate of public policy."'
166
But regardless of how the trial court on remand might resolve that issue,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey decided that the public policy exception was
not available to independent contractors. The majority's entire discussion on
the subject was this:
The wrongful discharge doctrine is grounded in public policy and is designed to
protect employees when failing to do so would violate a clear mandate of public
policy. It does not protect independent contractors. The doctrine grew out of a
need to protect at-will employees, who are under the total control of the employer
and without separate or independent contractual rights that provide employment
protections. 167
161. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:27-3 (West 1995).
162. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:27-5 (West 1995).
163. MacDougal, 677 A.2d at 173.
164. See id. at 172-73 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:9-22.5(d) (West 1995)).
165. Id. at 173.
166. Id. In a sharp dissent, Chief Justice Wilentz found a clear violation of public policy:
There is nothing complex about this case except the majority's treatment of it. It is a simple
case, as is the principle that should govern it: in New Jersey an employer should not be able
to fire an employee because, as a public official, that employee refuses to participate in a cor-
rupt fix.
Id. at 176 (Wilentz, J., dissenting). "The majority appears to weigh the employer's interest against the
employee's, disregarding the public's interest." Id at 185. He agreed, however, that the case needed to
be remanded on the question of MacDougall's employment status. Id. at 177-178.
167. Id. at 166. Chief Justice Wilentz was more hesitant about denying the exception to all inde-
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(Because the trial court had not decided the issue of MacDougall's em-
ployment status, the court left that determination to the trial court on remand.)
The court reached this decision despite its agreement with the plaintiff that the
underlying sources of public policy were meant to avoid undue influence of
public officials.1 68 Under a source-derivative approach, MacDougall's em-
ployment status at that point becomes irrelevant to the analysis. Once the
court accepted that the interest at stake was the prevention of corruption in
government, it should have disregarded any distinctions between employee and
independent contractor.
In Harris v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 16 9 a convenience store franchisee sued
the franchisor for "tortious breach of written contract in violation of public
policy," 170 among other claims. Harris alleged that the franchisor had "mis-
treated him" during his operation of the store by "failing to repair and refurbish
his unit as promised in retaliation for his failure to comply with [the franchi-
sor's] pricing dictates and his report of an underground gasoline leak to the
authorities."' 7 1 The case went to trial, and the jury found for Harris on the
public policy claim. The trial court granted judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict on that claim. Harris appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision on that issue. The appeals court acknowledged that the princi-
ple supporting a public policy claim was logically capable of extension.
1 72
It declined, however, to extend it in this case. The court was concerned
that extending the tort to commercial contracts would undermine commercial
stability, creating "the potential of turning every breach of contract dispute into
a punitive damage claim. ' 73 While the allegations in Harris are not clear
(particularly as to the legality of the alleged pricing irregularity), it seems that
if the plaintiff's relationship with defendant was terminated for reporting a gas
leak to authorities, he should have prevailed on his claim for violation of public
policy.
174
pendent contractors, and said that there was no need to decide the issue in that case. He would have
instructed the lower court to look more closely at the parties' relationship to see if the level of plaintiffs'
dependence on the defendant warranted a finding that he was an employee for purposes of applying the
public policy exception. See id. at 177-78 (Wilentz, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 172-73. Seven years earlier, however, that court decided that employees covered by
union contracts are entitled to invoke the public policy exception, even though their contract permitted
termination only for just cause. LePore v. National Tool and Mfg. Co., 557 A.2d 1371 (N.J. 1989). In a
case outside the employment context, the Supreme Court of New Jersey had in 1983 decided that a
racehorse owner could not be excluded from a racetrack for reasons that violate public policy. Mar-
zocca v. Ferone, 461 A.2d 1133 (N.J. 1983). In doing so, the court drew the analogy to the public pol-
icy exception to the employment-at-will rule. Id. at 1137.
169. 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 649 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
170. Id. at 650.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 656.
173. Id.
174. Werner v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 890 (D. Minn. 1993) was another
decision in which the court denied the independent contractor's claim for public policy violation, but
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As illustrated above, the trend has been to refuse relief to independent con-
tractors claiming a public policy violation. There have, however, been a few
notable exceptions. For example, in Caplan v. St. Joseph's Hospital,'75 a
California Court of Appeals case allowed an independent contractor to pursue a
public policy claim, not for wrongful discharge, but for wrongful withholding
of wages. Caplan was a physician in defendant hospital's emergency room
who was terminated when the hospital closed. Before the shutdown, Caplan
learned that the hospital had been withholding patient refunds: patients who
had prepaid a portion of their bills were not refunded the money when their in-
surance companies made payment. Caplan gave an interview to a local televi-
sion news station about the withholding. When the hospital closed, it owed
Caplan more than $10,000 in back wages. It refused to pay him the money in
retaliation for his interview. 176 Caplan sued for back wages. The court de-
apparently did not do so on the basis of his employment status. The Minnesota Supreme Court has not
definitively spoken on the fate of its common law public policy exception since the passage of that
state's whistleblower statute, but federal courts have said that there is no viable common law claim un-
der a public policy theory, even for employees. See supra note 29. In Werner, the plaintiff was an in-
dependent marketer of defendant's shoes who alleged he had been fired for refusing to participate in a
price-fixing scheme. Werner brought suit in federal court, asserting several claims, including one for
discharge in violation of public policy under Minnesota law. The court granted New Balance summary
judgment. Following the federal precedents, the court in Werner said that even employees in Minnesota
do not have a public policy common law claim, and that it would not extend a protection to independent
contractors that was not available to employees. Id. at 893.
Other cases have also declined to extend the public policy claim outside the employment context,
but without providing sufficient facts or analysis for useful discussion. E.g., Olsen v. City of Seattle,
No. 97-35640, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 29979, *2 (9th Cir. Nov. 20, 1998) (applying Washington law)
(denying police officers' claim arising out of defendant's "refusal to provide them with certain employ-
ment benefits and its decision to scale back its use of traffic control officers"); Burnett Techno-Metrics,
Inc. v. TSI, Inc., 44 F.3d 641 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying Minnesota law) (declining to extend public pol-
icy claim to an independent contractor whose termination was "retaliatory," opinion providing no other
information regarding circumstances of discharge); McNeill v. Security Benefit Life Ins. Co., 28 F.3d
891 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying Arkansas law) (denying claim to insurance agents terminated for objecting
to defendant's proposed sale of life insurance policies to financially weaker insurer; underlying source
of public policy unclear); McClure v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1046,
1060 (D. Minn. 1998), (denying claim to independent insurance agents terminated allegedly for con-
tacting state legislature "concerning the suitability of certain insurance products for consumers, includ-
ing products for their clients"; court finding no public policy claim and therefore not directly addressing
application to independent contractors); Derthink v. Bassett-Walker, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 510 (W.D. Va.
1995) (applying Virginia law) (not making clear the specific basis for plaintiff's wrongful termination
claim, saying only that it involved "business interest and good will," interests that did not implicate
public concerns); Abrahamson v. NME Hospitals, Inc., 241 Cal. Rptr. 396, 397 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987)
(denying claim to physician terminated allegedly for refusing to condone defendant's "failure to provide
patient care"); Dahlgren v. Caring and Sharing, Inc., No. CI-88-2275, 1989 Minn. App. LEXIS 318, *4,
(without discussion, denying claim to independent contractor-plaintiff); D.C. Amarasinghe v. Sentara
Hosps., 21 Va. Cir. 76, 77, Case No. C89-1758, 1990 Va. Cir. LEXIS 261 (finding no public policy
violation when physician's hospital staff privileges terminated in retaliation for plaintiff's "previous
exercise of a lawful right to seek legal redress of grievances"); Dulles Mutual Benefit Ass'n v. Air Tran-
sit, 15 Va. Cir. 140, Case No. 9956, 1989 Va. Cir. LEXIS 48 (finding no public policy violation for ter-
mination by private entity because of plaintiffs' exercise of free speech and right of assembly; also
finding public policy claim not applicable to franchisees or independent contractors).
175. 233 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1987) (not officially published).
176. The hospital's chairman of the board admitted in his deposition that one reason for not paying
Caplan was because of his interview. Id. at 902.
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cided that the hospital's retaliatory refusal to pay the back wages violated pub-
lic policy, and that tort remedies were appropriate. 177 The hospital argued that
Caplan was not entitled to the public policy claim because he was an independ-
ent contractor rather than an employee. The court correctly concluded that "the
distinction seems trivial," and that to deny the public policy exception to inde-
pendent contractors "would be to exalt form over substance."' 178 The court also
noted, however, that "[flor all practical purposes, Caplan was an employee: he
was paid a monthly salary, required to follow hospital guidelines, and subject
to discharge."'179 Although the case did not delve into the sources of public
policy, it seems plain that the public policy of not allowing hospitals to cheat
patients is soundly based in statutes prohibiting fraud, and perhaps other stat-
utes regulating hospitals. As the bases for the action were not employee-
protection measures, there was no reason to deny such a public policy claim to
an independent contractor.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court in Harper v. Healthsource New
Hampshire'80 became the first state high court to allow a non-employee to
bring a wrongful termination complaint based on a public policy violation.
Paul Harper was a participating physician with defendant, a health maintenance
organization. Their contract was terminable without cause by either party upon
six months notice. 181 Over the course of Harper's relationship with Health-
source, the portion of Harper's patient base insured in some way by Health-
source had grown to about 30 to 40 percent. Harper alleged that after nine
years as a participating physician with Healthsource, he realized that Health-
source had been manipulating patient treatment records, and that such inaccu-
racies were affecting subsequent patient reports. When Harper notified Health-
source of his concerns about the accuracy of his patients' records, Healthsource
informed him that they had reviewed the situation and found no problem with
patient care. It also informed him that his contract was being terminated for
failing to satisfy "recredentialing criteria."' 82 After Harper exhausted his ap-
peal remedies with Healthsource management, he sued for wrongful termina-
tion of the agreement. One of his several counts alleged that the termination
violated public policy. 183 The trial court dismissed all Harper's claims and
Harper appealed.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court decided that the trial court had erred
in dismissing the public policy claim despite the lack of an employment rela-
177. Id. at 905.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. 674 A.2d 962 (1996).
181. The contract also provided for termination with cause for nine enumerated grounds. Id. at 964.
182. Id. at 963.
183. Id. at 964.
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tionship. The court found Harper's relationship with Healthsource difficult to
define, Harper being neither an employee nor an independent contractor in the
way case law traditionally views such a relationship. 84 Regardless of Harper's
status, the court said that it would not permit a termination that contravenes
public policy.'8 5 It decided that the public had a "substantial interest in the re-
lationship between health maintenance organizations and their preferred pro-
vider physicians as well. This relationship is perhaps the most important factor
in linking a particular physician with a particular patient.... [T]he termination
of [Harper's] relationship with Healthsource affects more than just his own in-
terest."
1 8 6
The court found clear public policy in state statutes that create parameters
for preferred provider agreements between health insurers and physicians such
as Harper's. The New Hampshire legislature stated that the general policy be-
hind that chapter was that such agreements must be "fair and in the public in-
terest."18 7 The court also found a public policy in the common law's recogni-
tion that the doctor-patient relationship "ought to be sedulously fostered,"'
' 88
noting that evidentiary privileges protecting communications between patient
and physician recognize society's determination to place the doctor-patient re-
lationship "on a different footing" than most others. 189 The court in Harper
correctly emphasized the interests of the patients involved, rather than the rela-
tionship between physician and health maintenance organization. The court
did not ultimately decide whether the facts rose to the level of a public policy;
the question in New Hampshire ordinarily being one for the jury, 190 the court
sent the case back to the trial court.
In another case involving health care providers, a federal district court in
New Jersey allowed non-employees to pursue a public policy claim for wrong-
ful termination. In New Jersey Psychological Ass 'n v. MCC Behavioral Care,
Inc.,199 the plaintiffs were psychologists who contracted as providers for
184. Id. at 965.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 966 (citation omitted).
187. Id. (quoting N.H. REV STAT. ANN § 420-C:1 (1991)).
188. Id. (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285, at 527 (McNaughton rev. 1961)).
189. Id. The Court of Appeals of Colorado has recently decided that a provision providing for ter-
mination without cause in a service agreement between a physician and medical group treating patients
enrolled in a prepaid health plan did not violate public policy. Grossman v. Columbine Med. Group,
Inc., No. 98CA0668, 1999 Colo. App. LEXIS 286, *8-14 (Colo. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 1999). There were
apparently no allegations in that case, however, that the actual reason for plaintiffs' terminations (not
provided in the opinion) violated public policy. The issue was simply whether any no-cause termination
provision in such an agreement violates public policy. The dissent would have found that such a provi-
sion violates public policy because of the detrimental effects on patient care and on the physician's
livelihood. Id.
190. Short v. School Admin. Unit, 612 A.2d 364, 370 (N.H. 1992); Cloutier v. Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co., Inc., 436 A.2d 1140, 1145 (N.H. 1981).
191. No. 96-3080, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16338 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 1997).
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MCC, a managed care organization for mental health and substance abuse
services. MCC terminated the plaintiffs, allegedly because it did not agree
with the plaintiffs' patient treatment plans. The plaintiff-psychologists' suit
included a count for violation of public policy. The court denied MCC's mo-
tion to dismiss, citing as sources of public policy state regulations requiring
that health maintenance organizations' "utilization management determinations
shall be based on written clinical criteria and protocols developed with the in-
volvement from practicing physicians and other licensed health care providers
within the network."' 192 The regulations also provided that "all determinations
to deny or limit an admission, service, procedure or extension of stay shall be
rendered by a physician" and not by other employees of the organization.' 
93
Finally, the regulations also provided for providers "to advocate for pa-
tients with regard to utilization management determinations."' 94 The court,
stressing the patient's interest in a continuing relationship with a physician,
also looked to a New Jersey Supreme Court decision that found a "strong pub-
lic interest which prevents hospitals from 'arbitrarily foreclosing otherwise
qualified doctors from their staffs."" 95
The focus in New Jersey Psychological Association was, as it should be, on
the public policies involving patient care, rather than on the plaintiffs em-
ployment status. Whether the facts warranted the invocation of the public pol-
icy exception in that case is not as clear, the opinion denoting only that there
was a disagreement between the parties about patient care.
While not squarely deciding the issue, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Ro-
senfeld v. Thirteenth Street Corp.,196 has indicated that a public policy claim
should not depend on a showing of an employment relationship. In Rosenfeld,
the court allowed a physician to sue for a wrongful denial of staff privileges at
defendant-hospital. The claim was based on alleged retaliation for reporting
various illegal and unethical practices that included allowing incompetent phy-
sicians to treat patients, fraudulently billing insurance companies, and falsify-
ing medical records.' 97 The court found that the plaintiff was an employee,
and so did not need to decide whether a similarly situated independent con-
tractor would have had a claim under the same theory. However, the court did
note that the duty not to discharge a person for attempting to correct illegal and
unethical acts exists independently of the contract. "Consequently, whether the
192. Id. at *11 (quoting N.J. ADMIN CODE 8:38-8.1).
193. Id. (quoting N.J. ADMIN CODE 8:38-8.3).
194. Id. (citing N.J. ADMIN CODE 8:38-3.6).
195. Id. at *10 (quoting Nanavati v. Burdette Tomlin Memorial Hosp., 526 A.2d 697 (1987) (cita-
tions omitted)).
196. 117. Lab. Cas. (CCH) 156,446 (June 13, 1989).
197. The plaintiff also alleged that the denial of his privileges was motivated by anti-Semitism.
The court, in reversing summary judgment for defendant, did not clearly distinguish between the issues
of religious discrimination and whistleblowing.
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underlying contract which forms the parties' relationship is an employment
contract 'at will' or 'for cause' or creates some other form of relationship,
would appear to be irrelevant in determining whether a violation of public
policy has occurred."'198 The court in Rosenfeld thus recognized that the
proper inquiry should be on the public policy raised-here, the patients' safety
and financial protection-rather than on the form of the parties' relationship.
B. The Source-Derivative Approach and the Traditional Judicial Function of
Invalidating Contractual Terms that Violate Public Policy
It is a traditional judicial function to invalidate contracts or terms that vio-
late public policy, regardless of the character of the contracting parties.'
99
Courts have thus restricted the right to terminate relationships outside the work-
place when such termination would violate public policy. Courts in such cases
have correctly focused on the public policies at issue, instead of on the nature
of the parties' relationship. In L 'Orange v. Med. Protective Co.,"' for exam-
ple, the Sixth Circuit, applying Ohio law, decided that a malpractice insurance
carrier could not cancel the policy of a dentist in retaliation for testifying at a
malpractice suit against another dentist insured by the same carier. The insur-
ance policy was cancelable by either party with ten days' notice, but the court
found that the insurer's actions violated public policy. The court cited criminal
statutes prohibiting witness intimidation and noting the need for medical pro-
201fessionals as experts in malpractice cases. The court in L'Orange said it
would be meaningless to distinguish between the prohibition against creating a
contract to accomplish witness intimidation and the threat of termination to ef-
fect the same goal.2°2
Principles of public policy have also been invoked to prohibit retaliatory
203termination of tenancies. In the landmark case of Edwards v. Habib, a
month-to-month tenant was evicted in retaliation for reporting her landlord's
housing sanitation code violations to housing authorities. The court allowed
the tenant to assert a retaliatory-eviction defense based on District of Columbia
statutes and for reasons of public policy: "[W]hile the landlord may evict for
any legal reason or for no reason at all, he is not, we hold, free to evict in re-
taliation for his tenant's report of housing code violations to the authorities.
' a °4
198. No. 68, 585, 1989 Okla. LEXIS 105, at *13 (Okla. June 13, 1989) (emphasis added).
199. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 145.
200. 394 F.2d 57 (1968).
201. Id. at 62.
202. Id. at 63. But cf. Silver Eagle Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 423 P.2d 944 (Or. 1967)
(finding no violation of public policy when insurer cancelled coverage in anticipation of substantial li-
ability as result of insured's sale of defective products).
203. 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969).
204. Id. at 699.
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The court recognized that the underlying remedial legislation would be useless
if landlords could intimidate those who report violations.
20 5
Other courts have followed Edwards' lead.2°6 The Supreme Court of Utah,
for example, has recognized the defense when tenants were evicted for com-
plaining of violations of health department regulations. 20 7 The Supreme Court
of Wisconsin has allowed the defense where the landlord evicted month-to-
month tenants after they complained to health authorities of housing code
208sanitation violations. The California Supreme Court has recognized the de-
fense in cases where tenants suffered retaliation for withholding rent to make
the property habitable 20 9 where tenant-farmworkers were evicted from com-
pany-controlled housing for suing the landlord-employer for violations of a
farmworker protection statute210 and where a tenant was evicted because she
had reported to police that the landlord had sexually assaulted her niece.
211
While most cases allowing tenants to invoke a retaliation defense involve
residential tenancies, the Restatement takes no position as to whether such
212protection should be extended to commercial or industrial property. The
California Court of Appeal allowed a commercial tenant to invoke the defense
in Custom Parking, Inc. v. Superior Court,2 13 in which the defendant, a
month-to-month tenant, alleged it was evicted because its employees refused to
testify falsely in litigation involving the landlord and other tenants. The land-
lord sued the tenant for unlawful detainer when the tenant refused to vacate the
premises. The tenant based its defense on public policy grounds. The court
found no reason to distinguish between residential and commercial tenancies in
these circumstances:
It states the obvious to say that there is a strong public policy against intimidating
witnesses in a lawsuit from testifying honestly. In this context, the distinction be-
tween a commercial and a residential tenancy pales into insignificance.... Here, to
preclude the defense [of retaliatory eviction] would be to create a class of litigants,
commercial landlords, with a legally sanctioned means of punishing tenants who
testify honestly but adversely to the landlord in a lawsuit between the landlord and
third parties. To countenance such a result would be to put a judicial imprimatur
upon attempts to impair the truth-finding process of our legal system.
214
205. Id. at 701.
206. Today, many jurisdictions also offer statutory protection against retaliatory eviction. See An-
notation, Retaliatory Eviction of Tenant for Reporting Landlord's Violation of Law, 23 A.L.R. 5th 140
(1994); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: LANDLORD AND TENANT §§ 14.8 -14.9 (1977).
207. Building Monitoring Systems, Inc. v. Paxton, 905 P.2d 1215 (Utah 1995).
208. Dickhut v. Norton, 173 N.W.2d 297 (Wis. 1970).
209. Schweiger v. Superior Court, 476 P.2d 97 (Cal. 1970).
210. S. P. Growers Association v. Rodriguez, 552 P.2d 721 (Cal. 1976).
211. Barela v. Superior Court, 636 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1981). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROPERTY: LANDLORD AND TENANT §§ 14.7-.8 (1977), and cases cited therein.
212. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: LANDLORD AND TENANT §14.8 (1977).
213. 187 Cal. Rptr. 674 (1982).
214. Id. at681-82.
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The California Court of Appeal in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Handley,2 15 similarly
decided that the commercial/residential distinction was not determinative when
a petroleum distributor's lease was allegedly terminated in retaliation for exer-
cising his rights under state franchise law. Instead, the court said, the real issue
was the possibility of frustration of statutory purpose; if the plaintiff-distributor
could be evicted for exercising his statutory rights, the obvious aim of the un-
derlying statute would be thwarted. 16
The Supreme Court of Hawaii in Windward Partners v. Santos,2 1 7 permit-
ted the defense where farming tenants were evicted in retaliation for testifying
at a public hearing against the landlord's plans to re-designate the land as non-
farm property. The leases of some of the tenants restricted the use of the
premises to residential use; the leases of the other tenants were restricted to ag-
ricultural use. The court's decision did not turn on the distinction, finding that
all the tenant-defendants had a statutory right to testify at the public hearing
and that denying the defense to the non-residential tenants would frustrate the
legislative intent of that statute.
21 8
The courts permitting commercial tenants to invoke a retaliation defense
focused on the specific public policy at issue, not on the type of tenancy in-
volved. Whether a common law "wrongful termination" claim involves a ten-
ancy, insurance coverage, or working relationship, courts that look first at the
public interest at stake, rather than the nature of the parties' relationship, pro-
215. 143 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1978).
216. Id. at 327-28. But see, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Rubenfeld, 370 N.Y.S.2d 943 (N.Y. App. Div.
1975) (refusing equitable defense to commercial tenant-franchisee whose lease was not renewed alleg-
edly because tenant resisted landlord-franchisor's efforts to violate antitrust laws); William C. Comitius,
Inc. v. Wheeler, 556 P.2d 666 (Or. 1976) (refusing to extend retaliation defense to commercial tenant
whose lease was not renewed allegedly because of his refusal to engage in anti-competitive practices
and his refusal to agree to unlawful lease terms). Availability of the retaliatory-eviction defense to
commercial tenancies when such leases are intertwined with franchise agreements might also be affected
by statutes governing franchise relationships.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Espenschied v. Mallick, 633 A.2d 388 (1993), refused
to extend the retaliatory-eviction defense to commercial tenants who were evicted allegedly for com-
plaining of damage to the building structure and for assisting residential tenants in the same building in
pursuing their housing violation complaints. The court did, however, leave open the possibility that
under appropriate facts, a commercial tenant might assert a retaliation defense. Id. at 395.
A commercial tenant was recently permitted in Longview v. International Raw Materials, 979 P.2d
917 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999), to invoke the retaliation defense when he was evicted by his landlord after
publicly expressing concern about environmental hazards in the subject premises. Because the landlord
was a government entity, the court looked not only to the Edwards line of cases, but to constitutional
principles. In extending the defense to the commercial tenants, the court looked to two U.S. Supreme
Court cases deciding that the First Amendment protects independent contractors from the termination or
non-renewal of at-will government contracts in retaliation for their exercise of freedom of speech or
political association. O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996) and Bd. of
County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996). In deciding those cases, the Supreme Court empha-
sized the interests at stake, rejecting a rule that would have made the extent of First Amendment rights
dependent on the terminated party's employment status.
217. 577 P.2d 326 (1978).
218. Id. at 333-34.
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mote the enforcement of the laws that are the sources of public policy.
219
CONCLUSION
To decide wrongful discharge cases for violation of public policy based
only on employment status is to lose sight of the primary purpose of allowing
such a claim-protecting the public's interests. Unfortunately, most courts to
date have done just that. The alternative approach outlined here requires a
closer look at the source of the public policy in a particular case to determine
whether its purpose is to protect employees only or whether its purpose is one
that transcends the employment relationship. This source-derivative method of
examining wrongful termination cases based on public policy violations is con-
sistent with the common law tradition of intervening in a contractual relation-
ship when the public's interest warrants, while respecting the integrity of the
underlying source of public policy. This approach also keeps the focus on the
public's interests at a time when modem working relationships are becoming
more fluid and difficult to categorize.
219. An approach similar to the one outlined in this article might apply to retaliatory evictions. A
court would look to the source of the public policy on which the tenant's defense is based. Is the
source's purpose to protect only residential tenants (such as a health code provision that applies only to
homes)? Or is the purpose one that is not dependent on the relationship of the parties (such as a perjury
statute)?

